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ABSTRACT
Title of dissertation: DEPARTURE FROM COLREGS
Infringement or Good Seamanship.
Degree

: Msc

Good seamanship is a ubiquitous need of the maritime world and therefore
demanded by the general maritime law. Every seaman has to exercise reasonable
skill in order to avoid collisions. Lord Normand in The Queen Mary 1 defines:

“The ship must conform to the practice of good seamanship, it lays upon those in
charge of her the duty of taking account of all the concrete circumstances of the
emergency, and of acting with reference to them in their totality as a skilled seaman
of ordinary prudence would act.”

Consequently everybody considering ex post conducts in regard to collision cases
has to put himself in the position of the master and crew. This was expressed in the
US case H. F. Dimock 2 :

“(a) vessel should not ordinarily be held in fault simply because the courts, with
cool deliberation, after all the facts, determine that what was done was mistaken.
In such cases, a court should put itself in the position of a master at the time of the
circumstances involved, and consider that the rights of the parties, when maritime
contingencies are difficult and unusual, must ordinarily be settled according to his
determination, provided he has suitable experience and capacity, and exercises a
discretion not inconsistent with sound and good seamanship.”

To obey the doctrine of good seamanship requires not the absolute perfect seaman
who takes every, even the most unlikely, cause of accident into account. An error in
judgment by the crew does not automatically lead to a negligent act if that error was
1
2

The Queen Mary (1949) 82 Ll.L. Rep. 303.
The H.F. Dimock (1896) 77 Fed.226, 229.
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within the standard of good and prudent seamanship. Good seamanship does not
expect by him to foresee any cause. Otherwise a self regulating system like ISM
Code would be dispensable. Finally the judgment has to be based on facts. The
highest degree of nautical conduct is to be considerate of the danger to other ships.
Thereto counts warning other ships which one’s own ship endangers due to her own
difficulties.

International Convention does not explicitly oblige a crew to apply available modern
technical aids; this is a duty of good seamanship. Also, ship management has to use
shore-based technical aids to mitigate the risk of collisions. Particularly the
development of the Electronics Chart and Display Information System (ECDIS)
shows the influences of technology in regard to the determination of good
seamanship.

Today the duty of good seamanship is strongly coined by International Conventions
such as COLREGS and the STCW Convention. But good seamanship does only
demand compliance with the rules where it is reasonable. This principle is expressly
stated in rule 2(b) COLREGS. Even local rules not made by any authority govern the
duty of a seaman provided that they are firmly established, well understood, and
recognized by long usage.

Keywords: Good Seamanship, collision, technology, risk, local rules, COLREGS

v

Table of contents
Declaration

ii

Acknowledgements

iii

Abstract

iv

Table of Contents

vi

List of Tables

viii

List of Figures

ix

List of Abbreviation

x

1 Introduction
1.1. Background
1.2. The Human Element
1.3. Standard for apportionment of Liability

1
2
3

2 Human Element in Shipping Casualties
2.1 What is Human Error?
2.2 Classification of Error
2.3 Psychological Impact of the Human Brain in Decision Making
2.4 Violations of the regulation and why it occurs?

5
11
12
16

3 An Analysis of the phrase ‘Good Seamanship’
3.1 Responsibilities
3.2 Actions to avoid collision
3.3 Navigators and Their Judgment
3.4 Navigators and Their Duties

19
20
22
26

4 Analysis of the Collision Regulation
4.1 Rule 05 Look Out
4.2 Rule 09 Narrow Channels
4.3 Rule 13 Overtaking
4.4 Rule 14 Head–on Situations
4.5 Rule 15 Crossing Situations
4.6 Rule 19 Conduct of vessels in Restricted Visibility
4.7 Liberal Approaches in Application of the Collision Regulation.

30
34
36
43
46
52
56

vi

5 Establishing Collision Claims
5.1 Elements of Conviction
5.2 Fault
5.2.1 Elements of Fault
5.3 Causation
5.3.1 Burden of Proof
5.4 Inevitable Accident
5.4.1 Agony of the Moment
5.5 Trial of Liability
5.6 Apportionment of Liability- (Damages)

59
60
61
62
63
64
67
67
68

6. Conclusion
6.1 Seaworthiness
6.2 The ISM Code
6.3 Novus Actus Interveniens
6.4 Traffic Regulation

78
79
80
81

Annex 1
1.0 Model Maritime Traffic Regulation in Malacca Strait

i

Annex 2
1.0 Genimar and Larry L
2.0 Joaquin Ponte Maya and Martin Fierro

vii

xvi
xvii

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1

Reason for Manoeuvres Contrary to
COLREGS

viii

16

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1

The distinction between error and

10

violation
Figure 2

Classification of human error

Figure 3

Actions taken based on heading and not
course made good

12

43

Figure 4

Collision between Genimar and Larry L

Figure 5

Collision between Jouquin Ponte Naya
and Martin Fierro

Annex 2 xvi

Annex 2 xvii

ix

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
A.B.L.R.

Australian business law review

A.C.

Appeal cases

A.J.C.L

American journal of comparative law

A.J.I.L

American journal of international law

AMC

American Maritime Cases (1923-)

A.L.J.R.

Australian law journal reports

A.L.R.

American law reports or Australian law reports

Asp MC

Aspinall's Maritime Cases 1870-1940

Asp MLC

Aspinall's Maritime Cases 1870-1940

B.C.L.C.

Butterworths company law cases

c.

Chapter (of Act of Parliament)

C.A.

Court of Appeal

C.C.L.T.

Canadian cases on the law of torts

C.J.Q.

Civil justice quarterly

C.L.

Current law

C.L.J.

Cambridge law journal

C.L.P.

Current legal problems

C.L.R.

Commonwealth law reports (Australia)

Cr.App.R.

Criminal appeal reports

Cr.App.R.(S.) Criminal appeal reports (sentencing)
Csl.

Counsel

Crim.L.J.

Criminal law journal

D.C.

Divisional Court

Denning L.J.

Denning law journal

F Supp.

Federal Supplement (USA)

Harv.L.R.

Harvard law review

I.M.O

International Maritime Organization

x

ISM

International Safety Management system

I.L.M.

International legal materials

I.L.P.

International legal practitioner

Hag Adm

Haggard's Admiralty Reports 1822-1838

J.M.L.C.

Journal of maritime law and commerce

L.C.

Lord Chancellor

L.J.R.

Law journal reports

L.M.C.L.Q.

Lloyds maritime and commercial law quarterly

L.Q.R.

Law quarterly review

Lit.

Litigation

Ll. Rep.

Lloyd's list reports (before 1951)

Lloyd's Rep.

Lloyd's list reports (after 1951)

LT

Law Times Reports 1859-1947

LJP

Law Journal Reports New Series Probate, Divorce and Admiralty
1875-1946

M.L.J.

Malayan law journal

McGill L.J.

McGill law journal

Moo PCC

Moore's Privy Council Cases 1836-1862

O.D.I.L.

Ocean development and international law

O.J.L.S.

Oxford journal of legal studies

Prob

Law Reports, Probate Division 1891-

Sp Ecc & Ad

Spinks Ecclesiastical and Admiralty Reports

xi

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background
Despite the advances in marine technology, sophisticated electronic navigation aids,
satellite as well as new training methods for the navigators, maritime collisions
continue to feature prominently in all major maritime casualty statistics. Even though
collision rarely represent the major sector of the statistics, but when they do occur
they always involve significant losses.

Maritime collisions often results consequential losses such as death and personal
injury, marine pollution, fire, explosion, cargo loss, and damage of property. A
collision is defined as “the violent encounter of a moving body with another.” 1
Collisions at sea does not necessarily involve contact between two vessels, it could
also be a contact between a vessel and a bridge, wharf, crane, offshore structure and
this kind of contact is referred to as ‘allision’.
Maritime collision law originated from the ancient Roman law but during that period
there was no mentions of any specific navigational rules other than maritime custom
and the jurisprudence which concerns fault and liability for loss and damage. In 1840
the Trinity House Navigational Rules were established and followed by the first U.K.
statute that embodied navigational rules in 1846, which then developed with other
statutory rules in 1851, 1854 and 1858.

The first diplomatic conference on navigational rules, which was convened by the
U.S. President Benjamin Harrison in Washington in 1889, resulted in first
comprehensive set of international navigational regulations that became effective in
1897. 2 Many other conferences had been conducted, such as in Brussels, Belgium in
1910 and in London England, in 1948 and 1960 which had made series of changes to
1
2

Oxford English Dictionary, 2005
N.J. Healy & J.C. Sweeney, The Law of Marine Collision, Centreville: Cornell Maritime Press, 1998.
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the international collision regulations and in 1972 a major revision was being carried
out by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) that resulted in the Convention
on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 also known as
the COLREGS 1972. These regulations have been accepted by almost all maritime
states and are “applicable to all vessels upon the high seas and in all waters
connected therewith” 3

1.2 The Human Element
The basis of preventing maritime casualties and pollution of the sea is that ships must
not only be properly designed, constructed, equipped and maintained; but must also
be operated by adequate number of qualified officers and trained crews. It is well
recognized that the human element is a significant factor in a number of maritime
casualties. Many causes and chain of events culminate to an action where human
error becomes the contributing factor. Amongst which is the issue concerning fatigue,
an outcome of long hours of watch keeping which can lead to a degradation of
human performance, a slowing down of physical and mental reflexes and an
impairment of the ability to make rational judgments.

In order to observe the bridge watch keeping principle of ensuring the maintenance
of a safe navigational watch while maintaining of general surveillance of the ship,
Resolution A.481 (XII) adopted by the IMO 12th.Assembly recommended that –
a) The bridge watch should consist of at least one officer qualified to take
charge of a navigational watch and at least one qualified or experienced
seaman;
b) The provision of qualified deck officers should be such that it is not
necessary for the master to keep regular watches;
c) A three watch system should be adopted; and
d) Where the bridge watches consists of one officer and one seaman, there
should be the capability to provide schedules.
The situation is compounded for deep draft vessels whose navigation must be precise,
more so when such vessels require staging in order to avail of the "tidal window" at

3

International Regulations for preventing Collision at Sea, 1972, rule 1(a) (COLREGS 1972)
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specified target time over areas of critical controlling depths. To illustrate the
precision required, transits must be timed to pass such controlling areas not more
than 30 minutes either side of high water. This may give rise to compromising the
interpretation of safe speed under the International Collision Regulations. For further
assistance at any time if the officer of the watch requires additional help, such
assistance should be readily available and fit for duty.

Ship with only three watch-keepers including the master when transiting a Strait
would be hard pressed to meet the principles of bridge watch-keeping and cause their
officers to work on very strenuous schedule.

1.3 Standards for Apportionment of Liability
This analysis creates a major impact for the courts to render judgments with regard to
apportionment of liability. There is rarely a collision case where there is only one
ship to be blamed. The requirement for apportionment of liability in a fair trial
requires tremendous facts and proofs to ensure each vessel has received the
appropriate percentage of merits in the case. The analysis creates a guideline for the
court to identify the good practice of seamanship or a mere infringement of the
collision regulation. This guideline would be referred to for more accurate fact
findings to establish a fair judgment for both the defendant and the plaintiff.

The guideline would forbid the presumption of fault for every breach of the collision
regulation and thus quantification of fault during the trial would be of quality and not
quantity. Human involvement does not mean the same thing as human responsibility.
People may be involved in an accident without being responsible for it. The degrees
of intention, expectedness and avoidability are important to consider in assessing the
extent to which responsibility (or even blame) may be allocated to individuals. In
collisions, it may be more useful to allocate relative responsibility between ships.
The establishment of the guideline would be in the form of a traffic regulation for the
Malacca Strait where the rules for safe practice of seamanship will be identified and

3

thus an infringement of these rules exhibits the violation of good practice of
seamanship and even without a departure from the collision regulations the Master
could be identified as a violator and charged in court.

Chapter 2 identifies the human element factor contributing to marine casualty and
analyzes the psychological impact on decision making during the agony of a moment
before the collision. Chapter 3 explains the duties of a navigator at sea and elaborates
the liability and responsibilities for any infringement or breach of the safe practice of
seamanship. Chapter 4 analyzes the collision regulation and while identifying regular
infringement as per the regulations. Chapter 5 lay out the procedures for establishing
a collision claim.
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CHAPTER 2
HUMAN ELEMENT IN SHIPPING CASUALITIES
2.1 What is Human Error?
Human error has in recent time been known to be one of the main sources of
accidents at sea. Error is but one way of describing a human performance and is the
term used when no other explanation can be found for a system failure. Behavior still
consists of perception, attention, memory, action, etc., all functioning as they usually
do. It is only how we classify the result that defines the error. The actor who commits
an error recognizes it only after the fact, with the perspective provided by hindsight.
Either an actor or an external judge needs a model of task performance to be able to
decide whether an action has been correctly executed. In the context of this
dissertation, ‘error’ is defined as a human action that fails to meet an implicit or
explicit standard. An error occurs when a planned series of action fails to achieve its
desired outcome, and when this failure cannot be attributed to the intervention of
some chance occurrence.

While casualties can never be completely eliminated there is nevertheless a growing
feeling that present rates of casualties are still unreasonably high. When everything
else has been looked at and tried - newer designs, better sophisticated regulations and
enforcement systems at every level - one thing remains about which there is almost
universal agreement and that is that the underlying cause of casualties – is the human
factor. 4

Human involvement does not mean the same thing as human responsibility. People
may be involved in an accident without being responsible for it. The degrees of
intention, expectedness and avoidability are important to consider in assessing the
extent to which responsibility (or even blame) may be allocated to individuals. In
collisions, it may be more useful to allocate relative responsibility between ships. In
4

Marine Directorate (DOT), The Human Element in shipping casualties, London: HMSO, 1991, pp 126.
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none of the case looked at by the research team, was the one ship wholly to blame.
Some degrees of human responsibility could be located on at least one, and usually
both, of the two ships involved. 5

Following are the illustration of four recent disasters in the history of navigation
which identifies the cause as human error:

1) Herald of Free Enterprise
The tragic accident to the Herald of Free Enterprise on 6th march 1987, in which 195
people died, resulted in an official British inquiry, carried out by Lord Justice Sheen.
Its report into the causes of the disaster was published on 24th July 1987 6 .The ropax
( Car and Passenger Ferry) was overloaded and no doubt ballasted in the bows when
it left the port of Zeebrugge with its bow doors wide open. The water rushed
unhindered into the vehicle deck, quickly destabilizing and capsizing the ship.

Three men were accused of negligence. Captain David Lewry should have checked
that all proper procedures had been carried out before setting sail. The first officer,
Leslie Sabel, failed to check that the sailor responsible for closing the bow doors was
at his station before leaving the vehicle deck. This was assistant bosun, Mark Stanley,
who had fallen asleep in his cabin at the time of departure.

The inquiry also considered that the shipping company, Townsend Thoresen was at
fault at all levels, from the board of directors to management staff. The directors had
never really understood their responsibilities for safety, while management had never
really realized its duties. The company had run with clear lack of professionalism,
with a laissez-faire policy that had led to the rejection of several requests from

5

Ibid
Department of Transport, Formal Investigation on MV Herald of Free Enterprise, Report of the
Court no 8674, London: HMSO, 1987

6

6

shipmasters asking for installation of safety equipment, and stricter supervision of
the maximum number of passenger and freight weight on board. 7

2. Exxon Valdez
The biggest oil spill in the United States was caused by a series of operational and
navigational errors committed on board the Exxon Valdez, which ran aground off
Alaskan coast on 24th March 1989. 8

Shortly after the tanker left the Aleyska terminal, Captain Joseph Hazelwood decided
to move out of the compulsory traffic lanes in Prince William Sound, because of
drifting ice. He handed over control of the ship to a third mate unqualified to be in
charge on the bridge. Following a navigational error, the Exxon Valdez ran aground
on Bligh Reef, tearing its hull and spilling 40,000 tons of crude oil into the sea. 9 Nine
hours after the incident, the National Transport Safety Board (NTSB) carried out
alcohol tests on the ship personnel. Results for Captain Hazelwood were over the
limit. 10

During the inquiry carried out by the NTSB, the company Exxon Shipping stated that
the oil spill was the result of a human error by the third officer Gregory Cousins, who
had delayed bringing the ship back into the traffic lane. At the same hearing, the
State of Alaska recognized that the incident was the outcome of human and
organizational failure. Clearly the captain had been negligent, but Exxon itself been
very deficient in safety management on board the ship. 11

7

Boisson, Phillippe., Safety at Sea, Policies, Regulations and International Law, Paris: Bureau
Veritas , 1999, pp 288-301.
8
Ibid.
9
R.Cahill, Disaster at sea: Titanic to Exxon Valdez, London: Century, 1990, pp 214-228
10
‘Exxon sacks masters for alcohol abuse’, Lloyd’s List. 01st April 1989
11
National Transport Safety Board Marine Accident Report, Grounding of the U. S.Tanker Exxon
Valdez on Bligh Reef: Prince William Sound, March 24th 1989, Washington DC, 31st July 1990
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3. Scandinavian Star
On 7th April 1990, the ropax Scandinavian Star was swept by fire shortly after it
came into service on the route between Oslo and Frederikshavn. 158 people died in
the accident, and criminal investigations were opened by the Danish public
prosecutor. After twenty months inquiries, three people were charged, the shipmaster
Hugo Larsen, the operator Olsen Hansen, manager of the shipping company Da No
Lines, and the shipowner Henry Johansen. 12

In a lengthy report published in January 1991, an inquiry commission led by the
Copenhagen maritime and commercial court concluded that the ferry was not
operationally fit to carry passengers when brought into service on 1st April 1990. The
master was criticized for abandoning ship, before doing everything in his power to
save the passengers. More important, the inquiry revealed the numerous
shortcomings of the shipping line, notably the mixed crew, recruited too quickly,
unable to familiarize themselves with the ship in one week, and not been through a
fire drill onboard. 13

4. Braer
On 5th January 1993, the tanker ran aground and broke up on rocks in the Shetland
Islands, releasing its cargo of 84,700 tons of oil into the sea. The accident led to the
publication of three reports; published on 20th January 1994.The first two report is on
the causes of the shipwreck, by the British Marine Accident Investigation Branch
(MAIB) and the Liberian maritime administration, and the last third report by the
British Marine Pollution Control Unit, on the oil pollution issue. 14

The documents aimed sharp criticism at the behavior of the Greek shipmaster
Alexandros Gelis who, according to the British report, had been guilty of several

12

Tragedy could lead to improved safety on ferries, Lloyd’s List. 6th April 1991
Norwegian Official Reports, The Scandinavian Star disaster of 7thApril 1990, Main Report, Oslo:
Government Printing Service, 1991
14
‘Braer spill caused by series of failings’. Lloyd’s List. , 21st Jan 1994
13
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forms of negligence. He had failed in his duty to preserve the seaworthiness of his
vessel by taking no steps to secure or jettison the pipes carried on deck. Neither had
he opposed the fact that the whole crew crowded on to the bridge, abandoning the
main spaces, and in particular the engine room. 15

The report of the Liberian Bureau of Maritime Affairs emphasized the
communication difficulties between the master and the Shetland Coast Guard
concerning the need for towage. The grounding was not only caused by the lack of
professional competence, but also by the faulty reporting in the command chain, and
by the inability to select priorities in the information available or examine the
consequences of events. 16

Among the hypotheses of collisions conclude by the research team at HMSO marine
casualty investigation department, the following is apparent causes which was being
conclude in their report published in the ‘Human Element in Shipping Casualties’
report dated 1991 17 :
1) “In condition of poor visibility, ships put their reliance on radar: misinterpretation of
the picture on the screen is, however, still common, even though training and
equipment has improved.
2) There are limitations on the amount of information that human beings are able to
process. Ship navigators are aware of much more information that they ever
use .They pick and choose what they will attend to and what they will ignore. They
consistently show a preference for visual bearings, but factors like anxiety,
motivation, fatigue, and boredom will influence their ability both to perceive and to
process information, and hence to use it effectively in controlling the ship.
3) Fatigue is often cited as one of the main causes of collisions, but direct evidence is
hard to come by. Lapses of attention, awareness or vigilance can be proposed as
explanations in many collisions, which might lead us to suspect fatigue as the
underlying cause. One third of collisions occurred in the four hour period 0300-0700
hrs. This may have little to do with darkness or light, but could be linked to body
rhythms-changes in body temperature, and hence in performance-of the watch keeper.
4) Performance deviations appear not so much as mistakes or incorrect assessments of
risk, but as violations of rules or of accepted codes of practice. The violations

15

Department of Transport: Marine Accident Investigation Branch, Report of the Chief Inspector of
Marine Accidents into the engine failure and subsequent grounding of the motor tanker Braer at
Garths Ness, Shetland on 5th January 1993
16
Republic of Liberia: Bureau of Maritime Affairs, Report of investigation into the matter of loss by
grounding of the motor tanker Braer on the South Coast of Shetlands, 5thJan 1993, Monrovia 1994.
17
Ibid at 16
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sometimes seem to involve a complete disregard of the unpredictable elements in a
given situation.
5) The watch keeper is particularly liable to feel bored and isolated, which can alter his
state of awareness. He may lose orientation in space and time and all awareness of
himself. The possibility of something actually happening may come as a relief. The
self generated stress of close encounters may be felt to be exciting. In extreme cases,
the return to normality takes place only when things come to the worst. The
economic factors driving ships owners towards further reduction of crews make this
aspect of watch keeping important to be kept under review.”

The distinction between errors and violations is often blurred but the main
differences are shown in the table below:

ERRORS

VIOLATIONS

Stem mainly from informational factors, incorrect
or incomplete knowledge, either in the head or in
the world
They are unintended, and may be due to, a
memory failure( a lapse) or an intentional failure
( a slip)
They can be explained by reference to how
individuals handle information
The likelihood of mistakes occurring can be
reduced by improving the relevant information;
training, chart signs, the navigator-vessel
interface, etc.
Errors can occur in any situation. They need not
of themselves, incur risk

Stem mainly from motivational factors. Shaped
by attitude, beliefs, social norms and
organizational culture.
They usually involve intended or deliberate
deviations from the rules, regulations and safe
operating procedures
The can only be understood in a social context

Violations can only be reduced by changing
attitudes, beliefs, social norms and organizational
cultures that tacitly condone non compliance
( culture of evasion)
Violations, by definition, bring their perpetrators
into areas of increased risk, i.e. they end up
nearer to the edge.
Figure 1: The distinction between errors and violationsSource: U.K P& I Club newsletter at www.ukpandi.com, 2007 accessed: 20.06.2007

An error is any significant deviation from expectation, depending on statistical
criteria or experience of normal performance standards. Human error is a deviation
from expected human performance, which refers to the point that someone judging
whether an error has occurred must have a criterion. This particular distinction
concerns whether the actor’s behaviour alone is examined, or the performance of the
human – machine system as a whole.

An error may imply a deficiency in the actor; a deficiency in the bridge equipment
should be called a ‘failure’, or ‘equipment failure’. It would be preferable to use
‘failure’ instead of ‘error’ on the grounds that ‘failure’ would imply a context within
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which the error occurs, and ‘error’ would be reserved as a description only of human
action. Referring to UK P& I Club report in 1997, human error mainly of Deck
officer’s error contribute to 25 percent of collision cases where else equipment
failure only contribute to 8 percent of collision cases 18
An oil tanker British Trent was in collision with a bulk carrier Western Winner on 3rd
June 1993 .The investigation into the accident, which occurred in condition of
restricted visibility, identified a number of contributory factors. These factors
included an inadequate use of radar by both vessels given the prevailing weather
conditions which were causing restricted visibility, a lack of an efficient look out by
the British Trent, and unfamiliarity with the area combined with the lack of passage
plan on behalf of the Master of the Western Winner. The investigation report also
identified that the judgement of both Master’s in the build up to the collision may
have been impaired due to fatigue and stress. 19

2.2 Classification of Errors
Individual human errors (i.e. the failure of planned actions to achieve their desired
goal) have tended to be divided into two main groups, each having different
underlying causes and each needing to be addressed in a different way: 20

Slips and lapses: These are failures of execution of a planned set of actions. The plan
of action chosen is appropriate, but errors occur in the way the necessary actions are
carried out. Slips relate to observable actions and are associated with failures in
attention on behalf of an individual. Lapses are internal events in the ‘mind’ of the
individual and relate to failures of memory

Mistakes: These relate to the selection of a wrong or inadequate plan of action for a
particular goal. Human error mechanism could be classified as follows 21 ;
18

Bell, R.S.P. Bright., Human Factors in the marine environment, C.K& Earthy, 1997, p.5
Lloyds Register, Technical Association, Paper No.4, Session 1996-97
20
Reason, J., Human error, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990
19
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Classification of Human Error Mechanism
Set Objective or give priority
Ignore requirements of the situation
Suppress own opinion
Ignore problem
Did not take on challenge
Sense and detect
Lack of vigilance
Visual illusion
Perceive, identify and discriminate
False hypothesis, high expectancy
Overlook countersigns
Habit, stubbornness, stereotype fixation
Perceptual confusion
Recall
Forget isolation act
Misteke alternatives
Other slips of memory
Order or communicate
Slip of tongue
Vague/obscure speech
Contradictory/conflicting orders

Analyse and decide
Out of sight out of mind
Wrong condition – good rule
Overlook side effects
Did not anticipate situation
Wrong understanding of the situation
Wrong analysis-causality
Did not understand and dynamics
Great complexity
Right condition-wrong rule
No double checking
Act or Control
Action without intention
Spontaneous (non-planned) action
Distraction
Omission following interruption
Reversal
Repetition
Motor variability
Slip
Spatial disorientation
Slow feedback
Confusing noise

Figure 2: Classification of Human Error
Source: The Institute of Marine Engineers, IMAS 95 Conference on Management and operation of
ships

Slips, lapses and mistakes takes a major part of the classified human error and its
elements, but do navigators make an error in judgement at the imminent of a
collision and why is it that departure from the Collision regulations always occurs
during the last few minutes before the collisions?

2.3. Psychological Impact of the Human Brain in Decision Making
The nervous system is divided into two main parts: the central nervous system and
the peripheral system. The central nervous systems are composed of the brain and the
spinal cord, and it is the primary means for transmitting messages between the brain
and the body. The peripheral nervous system, on the other hand, branches out from
21

Kristiansen, S., An approach to systematic learning from accidents’, IMAS 95 Conference on
Management and operation of ships: Practical Techniques For Today and Tomorrow, The Institute of
Marine Engineers, 24-25, May 1995
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the spinal cord and brain and reaches the extremities of the body. It encompasses all
parts of the nervous system other than the brain and spinal cord.

There are two main divisions of the peripheral nervous system, the somatic division
and the autonomic division, both of which connect to the central nervous system. The
somatic division specializes in the control of voluntary movements – such as motion
of eyes to read books. Alternatively, the autonomic division is concerned with the
parts of the body that keep us alive – the heart, glands, and other organs that function
involuntarily without our awareness.

The autonomic division plays a particularly crucial role during emergency situations.
Suppose a navigator senses immediate danger of an impending collision, as
confusion races through his mind and fear may overcome his attempts to think
rationally, what happens to his body? If he is like most people, he will react
immediately on a physiological level. His heart rate may increase and he may begin
to sweat. The physiological changes that occur result from the activation of one of
two parts that make up the autonomic division: the sympathetic division. The
sympathetic division acts to prepare the body in stressful emergency situations,
engaging all of the organism’s resources to respond to threat. This response often
takes the form of “fight or flight”. In contrast, the parasympathetic division acts to
calm the body after the emergency situation is resolved. Both the sympathetic and
parasympathetic nervous system work together to regulate many functions of the
body. When one of this fails that is when a seafarer would omit to take the
appropriate action to avoid collision and during this moment, the seafarer may not be
able to think rationally and may involve making a departure from the regulations in
the agony of the moment. 22

22

Wood, S.E., Wood, E.R.G., Wood, E., & Desmarais, S., The World of Psychology , 4Th Canadian
Edition, ON: Toronto, Pearson Education Canada Inc., 2005
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In attempting to assess the responsibility for the casualty between Genimar and
Larry L 23 , the court turned its attention first to the traffic separation scheme in which
it occurred. The scheme was first adopted in 1967 and afterwards approved by IMCO
now IMO. That, however did not make compliance mandatory at the time of the
collision. It nonetheless quickly became recognized that good seamanship required a
mariner to follow the scheme unless another overriding consideration compelled him
to ignore it. Compliance with the scheme, however, does not exempt one from
adherence to the collision regulations, though it does seem to have created that
unfortunate impression in the minds of some and apparently was a consideration in
this collision.

Unlike many landmarks cases, this one is of relatively recent vintage, no doubt
because the rule to which it applies [10 (b)(i)] is of recent vintage itself. It had not
yet been accepted as law since the rule concerning traffic lanes was only
incorporated into the new body of rules adopted in the very year and month of the
year in which the collision happened, and only came into force in 1977. Traffic lanes
23

Genimar / Larry L
The 3,353 Grt Liberian freighter Genimar was on a voyage from Newcastle, New Brunswick to
Rotterdam carrying a cargo of some 4,700 tons of zinc concentrates. The Greek registered Larry L, of
16,357 Grt, was embarking on a roughly reciprocal voyage in ballast from Antwerp to a port on the St.
Lawrence River. The collision occurred on October 1, 1972, in the Dover Strait, near the South Fall
buoy, not long after the change of watch at 0400 hrs.
The master and chief officer watched Genimar for several minutes without any appreciable change of
bearing, with her masthead lights open to the left and showing red sidelight. The master then blew five
short blasts on the whistle as a warning, being under the impression that it was Genimar’s duty to give
way as she was proceeding in the wrong direction in a traffic lane. With the distance still closing and
no sign of a course change by the rapidly approaching vessel, Larry L’s master ordered hard right
wheel and blew one blast. The helmsman had applied 10 degrees rudder and the ship began to swing
to starboard when the chief officer on the starboard wing reminded the master of the presence of Pearl
Creek shouting “Captain, we close the other ship, very dangerous.” The master responded to the
warning by ordering hard-a-port.
Larry L appeared to be crossing from port to starboard at a narrow angle, and it was decided to haul
10 degrees to the right to attempt to pass port to port. Geminar held to that course until the distance
between the ships had closed to less that half a mile, unaware that the Greek ship had altered 3½
degrees to port at almost the same time Genimar hauled to starboard. At this point, the master ordered
hard right rudder and blew one blast on the whistle. Genimar responded quickly, but a tow blast signal
was heard from Pearl Creek( vessel overtaking Genimar from the starboard),Larry L which was now
swinging to port. Both vessels swung rapidly through more than a right angle before Larry L struck
Genimar at an angle of about 45 degrees leading forward. The bow of the Greek ship penetrated
deeply into the port side forward of the Liberian vessel damaging her fatally.
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by then (October 1972), had nevertheless, become so common a feature of the
marine landscape particularity the precedent setting scheme in the Dover Strait , that
it was predictable that the first collision that came to trial involving a violation of this
“custom” would almost inevitably set a precedent.

It was held, that under the conditions of visibility prevailing, that the Steering and
Sailing Rules applied, and Larry L a give way vessel and Genimar the stand on ship.
Under the circumstances , Larry L should have made an appreciable alteration to
starboard or, if she felt the presence of Pearl Creek made this unadvisable, a
substantial reduction in speed. She did neither, and made two small changes to port
that further complicated the situation. Genimar, however, was held to blame for her
failure to stand on, having altered ten degrees to starboard after first sighting Larry L.
Her subsequent turn to starboard when in extremis be judged proper, but Larry L’s
hard left turn was understandably condemned. The court took note of the fact that the
maneuvers of the master of the Greek ship seemed to stem from an attitude on his art
that, as he was proceeding in the proper lane and the other vessel was advancing
against the traffic flow, it was up to her to get out of the way.

Brandon J. went on to say that, while there might be cases in clear weather where
contravention of a Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) by a vessel might be a fault, it
would not necessarily be a causative fault. Such a situation might arise where two
ships collided with no others about. The present case, however was not of that kind,
The visibility was poor and threatened to become worse. It was, moreover, night and
the Dover Strait is always a scene of heavy traffic. In this case the presence of Pearl
Creek to starboard of Larry L inhibited the freedom of maneuver of that vessel and
undoubtedly impinged upon her navigation, creating difficulties in her meeting of
Genimar that might otherwise have arise. Notwithstanding this, the judge found that
while the presence of Genimar in the wrong lane created a situation out of which the
collision followed, this fault was comparatively minor in respect to the disregard of
Larry L of the Collision Regulation. The imprudent and unseamanlike handling of
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Larry L was judged to be the major cause of the collision and Larry L was
accordingly held responsible for two thirds of the blame.

2.4 Violations of the Regulation and why it occurs
Looking at the MARS reports in Seaway magazine, the late Captain Francois Baillod,
the initiator for the project to educate seafarer on understanding COLREGS and head
the International survey among sea staff, training staff and examiners to discover the
norms, problems and influences which affect decisions on the bridge, he had
observed that 74 percent of reported incidents related to uncertainty, violations and
disregard for the COLREGS. Calling on his own extensive experience in command,
Captain Baillod quoted a number of possible reasons for this poor state of affairs.
These included inadequate manning, many unnecessary distractions, fatigue, and
reluctance to manage speed, over reliance on electronic aids and just plain poor
seamanship among many others.

Reasons For Manoeuvres Contrary to COLREGS

Ignorance/Disregard
Reluctance to deviate/slow down

Reasons

Poor Lookout
Poor appreciation
Excessice delay in altering
lack of experience
Other vessel wrong action
Avoid collision
Limiting circumstances
In extremis action
Percentage
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20

Table 1: Reasons for Manoeuvres Contrary to COLREGS
Source: Seaway, July 2003, p.13
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The above chart indicates that the percentage of incidents or collisions actually
occurs because navigators are ignorance to the Collision Regulations and make
unnecessary departures from the regulation which results in a disaster.
Maritime New Zealand had in February 2006 released a news report on the case of
collision between two vessels in New Zealand with the findings from the Court
directing to breach of the Collision regulations and safe practice of seamanship 24 :
“Ferry master convicted for serious breach of maritime rule
Professional seafarers must adhere to rules and regulations for preventing collisions.
This was the clear message from today’s conviction in Wellington District Court of
David Curd, 66, a former Master of the Cook Strait ferry Aratere,in relation to an
incident in Wellington Harbour last year. Mr. Curd pleaded guilty for failing to navigate
the ferry according to a rule relating to crossing situations.
The incident happened just after 4.30am on 10 April last year when Aratere was
entering Wellington Harbour, and the chemical tanker Bow de Jin had departed Seaview
bound for Timaru.
Both vessels were heading towards one another and a risk of collision existed. Under
Maritime Rules, Aratere was required to keep out of the way of the Bow de Jin and
avoid crossing ahead of Bow de Jin. But the Master of Aratere failed to realize the risk
of collision had developed, and failed to take early and substantial action to keep clear.
Director of Maritime NZ, Russell Kilvington, says Mr. Curd breached maritime rules by
failing to appreciate the situation that had developed. This was a serious breach of a
fundamental rule of good seamanship. Masters of vessels have a responsibility for the
lives of those on board and for their vessel, and they must at all times act diligently,
competently and professionally. In this case, Mr. Curd did not.
‘Clearly, a collision between the two vessels of this size would have had potentially
disastrous consequences for their crews and passengers. Fortunately, the crew of Bow
de Jin took urgent evasive action to avoid this happening,’ he said”

During World War II, a British patrol plane flies over the Bay of Biscay. Inside, an
observer peers at a speckled, flickering radar screen looking for a tell-tale spot of
light or ‘blip’ that will signal the presence of an enemy submarine on the surface of
the sea. The observer has been on watch for a little over 30 minutes and nothing
much has happened. Perhaps this mission, like so many others, will be fruitless.
Suddenly, the ‘blip’ appears but the observer makes no response. The ‘blip’ appears
a few more times. Still the observer fails to respond. Evidently, the signal has gone

24

Maritime New Zealand , Media Release 20th February 2006, RCCNZ Media Line
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undetected and as a result, so has the submarine. 25 The concept of attention of this
matter may encompass three major subdivisions: (1) alertness or the ability to
maintain optimal sensitivity to external stimuli, (2) selection or the ability to
concentrate awareness upon one source of information rather than another and (3)
limited processing capacity, a term which reflects the difficulty people have in
processing two tasks simultaneously.

The vigilance decrement refers not only to the decrement in detection rate that is
most commonly reported in vigilance studies, but also to the decrement in speed of
response. In many commercial maritime environments, mariners traditionally endure
harsh working conditions, extreme temperatures, long working hours (more than
eight hours per day), frequent separation from the loved ones, fatigue, and long
service periods sometimes exceeding three consecutive months in duration. While a
ship’s endurance is determined by how long it can support operations at sea without
replenishing supplies or requiring in-port maintenance, its crewmembers endurance
can be described as a function of physiological and psychological factors.

The term crew endurance refers to the ability to maintain performance within safety
limits while enduring job related physiological and psychological challenges. Crew
endurance is a function of a complex system. Factors such as the emotional state of
crew members like stress, hours of work per day, quality and duration of rest periods
(sleep), physical conditioning, diet and stability level of physiological systems (the
biological clock), exert a direct influence on individual energy levels, alertness, and
performance. 26
The fatigue incurred by this mariners very much affect the decision making and
judgment of a navigator during their watch keeping and thus this much effects their
ability to conforms and take appropriate avoiding action in the agony of a collision.

25

Warm, S. Joel, Sustained Attention In Human Performance, Suffolk: John Wiley & Sons, 1984, pp
2-303.
26
Comperatore, A.Carlos., Kingsley, Leonard., The Commercial Mariner Endurance Management
System, United States Coast Guard, CERMT, 1999
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CHAPTER 3
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PHRASE ‘GOOD SEAMANSHIP’
3.1 Responsibility
The obligation on the part of the owner, Master or crew to comply with the rules
(COLREGS 72) is imperative. They must carry out the duties and take the actions
stipulated by the rules. They must also take the precautions required by the ordinary
practice of seamen. Failure to comply with the rules of the ordinary practice of
seamen may be regarded as fault which, if it causes damage, will bring about civil
liability. Criminal liability may also be invoked where failure to observe the rules is
made an offence.

Ordinary practice of seamen or good seamanship: There is no rigid test as to what is
meant by “ordinary practice of seamen”. This is a question of fact to be decided in
the light of all good illustration of the concept of good seamanship.

Good seamanship is a fundamental principle from which all other rules, including the
collision regulations were derived. However the advantages of the rules in this
respect are that they make it clear that how actions are to be carried out. Other
encounters or situations not specifically covered by the rules are, of course, subject to
the concept of good seamanship. In brief, the rules are part-and perhaps a small part
of the concept of seamanship. Therefore, the adherence to the rules is a prima facie
evidence that the mariner is not guilty of bad seamanship.

Good seamanship serves to fill gaps in the rules which do not provide an answer for
all encounters. The Collision Regulations does not contain an answer for all
encounters. The rules do not contain the whole wisdom of the sea. Even for the
duties and actions required by the rules, the contents may not be fixed and solutions
could be found in the concept of good seamanship. Otherwise the law would have
failed if it can offer no remedy for the action or the duty to be taken.
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Many years before the rule of the road was established by Act of Parliament, the
practice of seamen had established rules to enable approaching ships to keep clear of
each other. These rules, which are the foundation of those now in force, were well
establish by custom, and formed part of the general maritime law administered by the
Admiralty Court. A rule of the road for ships on opposite tacks existed in the latter
part of the eighteenth century. Admiralty regulations of that time direct that a ship on
the larboard tack shall bear up for another on the starboard tack. In the Earl of
Warwick’s Sailing Instructions of 1645 there is a Rule directing that no captain shall
take the wind of an admiral, and the Duke of York’s Sailing Instructions of about
1670 contained a Rule to the like effect. In neither of those codes, nor in any of the
pleadings or sentences of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, is there any trace
of the “port tack” rule.

It is clear that the precautions of good seamanship as defined by custom and case law,
provides for sensible behavior. Since its rules are supported by professional mariners,
they applied in the spirit as well as in the letter.

3.2 Actions to avoid collision
Tasmania –City of Corinth
“It is provided by the Rule…that, in obeying and construing the Rules, due regard shall
be had to any special circumstances which may render a departure from them necessary
in order to avoid immediate danger. As soon then as it was, or ought, to a master of
reasonable skill and prudence, to have been obvious that to keep his course would
involve immediate danger, it was no longer the duty of the Master of the Tasmania to
adhere to the …Rule. He was not only justified in departing from it, but bound to do so,
and to exercise his best judgment to avoid the danger which threatened”(Lord
Herschell,1890)

In case the strict adherence to any rules of the collision regulations puts the ship in a
potential collision situation, paragraph (b) (Rule 2 COLREG 72) allows the Master
the right to depart from this rule. Thus any rule can be broken when prudence and
good seamanship demands and this is allowed under paragraph (b) (Rule 2
COLREGS 72), known as the general prudential rule.
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This was first noted in the Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act 1862 section 29
that:
“If in any case of collision it appears to the court before which the case is tried that
such collision was occasioned by the non-observance of any regulation made by or in
pursuance of this Act, the ship by which such regulation has been infringed shall be
deemed to be in fault, unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the
circumstances of the case made a departure from the rule necessary.” 27

It is desirable in considering section 29 and its equivalents in later legislation, to bear
in mind the “Proviso to save special cases” contained in Rule 19 of the regulations of
1863, and the corresponding provisions, 28 which are in approximately similar terms,
in subsequent regulations. 29 The terms of Rule 19 of 1863 Merchant Shipping Act of
The United Kingdom were as follows:
“In obeying and construing these rules, due regard must be had to all dangers of navigation:
and due regards must also be had to any special circumstances which may exist in any
particular case rendering a departure from the above rules necessary in order to avoid
immediate danger.”

Conditions for departure: departure from the rules is justified where four conditions
are fulfilled:
a) It is absolute necessary
b) It is adopted to avoid immediate danger
c) It is exercises to the extent that such danger requires
d) The course adopted was reasonable in the prevailing circumstances.
All four conditions are to be assessed according to the concept of good seamanship
as per paragraph (a) of Rule 2 COLREG 72. A vessel may assume that other vessels
will observe the rules and navigate prudently and therefore may determine their own
course accordingly. Thus, a vessel is not justified in departing from the rules merely
because the navigator fears that the other ship will not comply with them similarly,
where a ship is put into difficulty by the faulty conduct of another ship, this is not an
excuse to depart from the rules-where a ship takes an action contrary to the rules,
27

The wording of this section seems to have been suggested by a passage in the judgment of The
Fenham (1870) L.R.3 P.C.212, The Bougainville and James C. Stevenson (1873) L.R. 5 P.C. 316, The
Palestine (1865) 3 W.R.111, The Pennsylvania (1870) 23 L.T.55
28
“Rules” up to January 1,1954, “rules” in the Regulations for Preventing Collisions At Sea which
came into force on that date
29
See The Memnon (1889) 6 Asp.M.C.488; 62 L.T.84 and (r.2(b) of the present COLREGS 72)
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such action cannot be binding on the other ship. However, if the latter assented to it,
both vessels have the right of way and both are required to proceed with extreme
caution.

3.3 Navigators and Their Judgments
The truth is that Rules are equivocal. As things now stand they have to be. But this is
no blessing; it is necessary evil. At present the mariner perforce must often cope with
uncertainty, a rule saying ‘Do thus and not otherwise’ is unfitting and potentially
iniquitous; the best available rule is in essence only an injunction to caution and
alertness. At the opposite extreme, if all uncertainty could be dispelled for all the
parties-whether two or many-a one best action could be singled out for each. The
best rule then would say. ‘This is what is right; do it’. To be sure, this sort of rule
would deprive the mariner of responsibility - the responsibility to guess, with the
safety of his/her ship as the forfeit one mariner would say commonsense but one
might say prudence, would rejoice at such deprivation? 30

The navigator must be constantly on guard against the danger of making faulty
judgments due to errors in his/her observation or his/her assumptions. Among the
latter includes, for example, assumptions about what the navigator of the other ship is
making and what he/she is likely to do. All would agree that a mariner must respond
to any possibility, however remote, not only of a collision, but of a dangerously close
encounter. A more contentious question is: should he/she take avoiding action and if
so, what action, when the situation is known to be safe; that is when he/she is able
confidently to assess the near miss distance as being non-zero. This means that the
two navigators may arrive at different estimates of the sign of the miss distance and
there is possibility that their maneuvers will cancel out and give rise to a collision. 31

30

Sadler, D.H., The mathematics of collision avoidance at sea, The Journal of Navigation, Nov 1998,
pp.306
31
Hollingsdale, S.H., The Effect of Observational Errors on the avoidance of collision at sea. The
Journal-The institute of Navigation, (Oct 1964),Vol.17.No.4, pp 345-357, 1964
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The essential elements of actionable negligence were stated in 1823 by Lord Stowell
in The Dundee 32 , a case of collision between two vessels, to be:
“a want of that attention and vigilance which is due to the security of other vessels that
are navigating on the same seas, and which, if so far neglected as to become, however
unintentionally, the cause of damage of any extent to such other vessels, the maritime
law considers as a dereliction of bounden duty, entitling the sufferer to reparation in
damages”.

It is the duty of seaman to take reasonable care and to use reasonable skill to prevent
the ship from doing injury, 33 and what is reasonable must be tested by the
circumstances of each case. 34 The negligence usually relied on is a failure to exercise
the skill, care and nerve which are ordinarily to be found in a competent seaman,
amounting to a breach of the duty of good seamanship, or a breach of the
international or local regulations for preventing collisions. The incidents of the duty
to exercise good seamanship depend on the circumstances of each case. The duty of
good seamanship may also require the crew of a vessel to observe the collision
regulations 35 or the local regulations.

The law requires that a seaman should exhibit ordinary presence of mind and
ordinary skill, but it is manifested that at a moment of great difficulty 36 a person may
do, or omit to do, something which may contribute to the collision, without thereby
showing himself/herself deficient in ordinary skill, care and nerve. 37 A wrong step
thus taken in the agony of collision is not negligence 38 and, unless the emergency
32

(1823) 1 Hag. Ad.109 at 120
The Voorwaarts and The Khedive (1880) 5 App. Cas 876,890, per Lord Blackburn.
34
The George Roper (1880) 8 P.D. 119, following The Andulusian (1877) 2 P.D. 231; The Velox
(1955) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 376 (when a seaman is called upon to face wholly exceptional conditions,
ordinary case itself necessarily demands that exceptional precautions may have to be taken.)
35
The Albion (1953) P.117 at 117,128
36
The Voorwaarts and The Khedive (1880) 5 App. Cas. 876, 891, 903.The difficulty or danger is
usually caused by a vessel with which the ship, excused for a wrong step, is in collision but this is not
always the case; see e.g. The Westcove and The Hebburn (1941) 70 Lloyd’s Rep.205 (a vessel
avoided collision with a ferry which put in difficulty and was held free from blame for a collision
which followed with the third vessel)
37
See The Circe (1935) 53 Lloyd’s Rep. 310,313, where Langton J. expressed the view that both the
directing and executive minds were within the rule but it was, he held, unnecessary to decide this
“quite novel and most ingenious point”.
38
The Sisters (1876) 1. p.d.117; The Jesmond and the Earl of Elgin (1871) L.R.4 P.C.1,7; The
Marpesia (1872) L.R. 4 P.C.212; Vennall v.Garner (1830) 1.Cr. & M.21;The City of Anthwerp and
33
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was caused by his/her fault, the ship will not thereby incur liability. If the imminent
danger of collision leading to the wrong step being taken was the result of negligence
on the part of the other vessel, that other will be held to blame for the collision. But
the principle applies in all cases of sudden and great danger whether caused by
negligence or not; and where two ships by no fault of their own, suddenly find
themselves in a position in which a collision is imminent, and if one of them omits to
execute a maneuver which possibly might have averted the collision, he/she will not
necessarily be held in fault for not having taken the measure suggested. 39
In the Hessa 40 , Hill J. said:
“When a man by the fault of another is presented with a choice between two perilous
courses, the comparative perils must not be too nicely weighed, nor must the choice be
held a wrong one if the course chosen does not attain its object. What is demanded of
the man who had to choose is that he should exercise judgment and discretion as
becomes a reasonable and prudent seaman.”

The decision in The Bywell Castle entitles a seaman to a favorable consideration, yet
where he/she has the choice of several alternatives, any of which would, as it turns
out, avoid a collision, and he/she does the one thing which is almost certain to cause
it, and does, in fact undoubtedly contribute to it, it has been held that he/she will not
be excused for that wrong action as being taken in the agony of collision. 41
In the decision made for the case The Memnon 42 Lord Herschel in addressing the
House of Lords said 43 :
“When once it is shown that it was brought home, or ought to have been brought home,
to the mind of the master of the vessel, that the courses upon which the ships were
approaching , and the circumstances, involved risk of collision, the onus is thrown upon
the Friedrich (1868) L.R.2 P.C.25; The Bertagne (1921) 7 Lloyd’s Rep 127; The Ulrikka (1922) 12
Ll.L.rep.429
39
The Marpesia (1872) L.R.4 P.C.212, N.74 (neither ship to blame, inevitable accident); see also The
Resolution and the Langton (1789) Nelson c. Fawcett, Mars.Ad. Cas.332
40
The Crown (Adolph Woerman) v. Hessa,n.77 above at 213
41
The Testbank (1941) 70 Lloyd’s Rep 270.276, per Langton J.; the Court of Appeal(1942) 72
Lloyd’s Rep.6 varied proportions of blame, the vessel put in sudden danger being held one half
instead of one quarter to blame; see also The Lowdock v. Edwards (1941) 70 Lloyd’s Rep.133,136,per
Hodson J.
42
(1889) 6 Asp. M.C. 317,CA.488,HL
43
(1889) 6 Asp. M.C. 488,490
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him of justifying his not doing that which the rule prescribes…The question whether a
departure was necessary or not must no doubt be determined by the court; but it must be
determined upon the point being raised, and upon some evidence being tendered to the
court to show that to have followed the rule would have either created that very risk of
collision which it was the purpose of the rule to avoid, or have increased instead of
diminished the risk of collision.”

The statutory obligation to obey

44

the regulations remained, so that it is a breach of

duty not to observe an applicable regulation, unless the departure from the prescribed
course can be justified under Rule 2(b) 45 . Thus , in The Voorwarts and the
Khedive 46 , the master of the Khedive would probably under the present law still have
been held guilty of an act of negligence, and the question for the court would have
been , did or did not that negligence contribute to the collision and damage? In the
Voorwarts and the Khedive there appears to have been a difference of opinion on the
point between the nautical assessors, those in the court of first instance thinking that
it did, and those in court of appeal that it had no material effect. The question was not
decided, for at that time the presumption of fault applied irrespective of whether or
not an infringement did contribute to the collision, provided that it might possible
have done so; but it would seem as if the decision would have turned on where the
burden of proof lay. If it had been for the Khedive to clear herself it is doubtful if she
could have done so, and almost as unlikely that the Voorwarts could have proved the
Khedive in fault. The question whether a breach of the regulations contributed to the
collision is one of pure fact for the court to decide on the whole of the evidence. In
the majority of cases a satisfactory conclusion can be reached without considering
where the burden of proof lies, but the decision in doubtful cases will probably
depend on where the onus rests. The onus lies upon the vessel alleging an
infringement to prove it and to prove that it contributed to the collision and
damage. 47

44

Now Reg. 4, Merchant Shipping (Distress and Prevention of Collision) Regulations 1996
Collision Regulations 1972
46
(1880) 5 App. Cas 876
47
Owners of S.S.Heranger and the Owners of S.S.Diamond (1939) A.C.94, 104.
45
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3.4 Navigators and Their Duties
Common law 48 imposes on the Master several duties arising from the concept of
good seamanship. In The Vysotsk 49 , Sheen J. said: Vysotsk was guilty of an alteration
of course which was made in breach of her duty and in defiance of good sense.
Her/his conduct is inexcusable 50 .It is the duty of the master to act with proper skill
and care. The duty may derive from common law or may be imposed by a statute.
The following are a few examples of duties deriving from good seamanship;
appraisal, planning and monitoring. It is the duty of the Master to prepare for his/her
voyage in order to achieve a safe passage, he must obtain the charts covering the area
or areas through which the ship will proceed and see that they are corrected. He must
also obtain details of: 51

a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

Currents (direction and rate of set)
Tides (times, heights and direction of rate of set)
Draught of ship during the various stages of the intended passage.
Advise and recommendations given in sailing directions
Navigational lights (Characteristics, range, arc of visibility and anticipated
raising range)
f) Navigational marks (anticipating range at which objects will show on radar
and/or will be visible to the eye)
g) Traffic separation and routeing scheme
48

In Donoghue v. Stevenson(1932) A.C.562, where Lord Atkin formulated the famous principle that :
“You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be
likely to injure your neighbour.” Who then in law is my neighbour? The answer is the persons who are
so closely and directly affected by the act. See also Lord Macmillan who said that the categories of
negligence are never closed.
49
(1981) 1 Lloyd’s Rep.439
50
See The St.Louis (1984) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 174.at p.181.(sounding a signal which is not mandatory is
permissible).See also Afran Transport Co.v. The Bergechief (1960) AMC 1380, where it was stated:”
If a vessel carries properly functioning radar equipment and she is in or approaching an area of known
poor visibility, there is an affirmative duty to use the radar.” In the Ian Fleming Report of Court
No.S.494 Darling, R.D., Q.C., found that the Skipper failed to navigate in accordance with the most
elementary principles. He failed to make proper use of the various navigational aids which he had at
his disposition. There was ample time for taking proper action. Engines should have been stopped at
once. Stopping engines is always desirable as it gives more time for action and also lessens the
damages if collision cannot be avoided.
51
See M. Notice 854.See also the Code of Good Management Practise in Safe Ship Operation issued
jointly by the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and The International Shipping Federation
(ISF), where it is stated; “Safety and efficiency are integral to good management. They can only be
result of structured, painstaking policy and a combination of the right skills, knowledge and
experience. The direct involvement of the decision –taking management in these matters is vital.”
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h)
i)
j)
k)

Radio aids to navigation
Navigational warnings affecting the area.
Climatological data affecting the area.
Ship’s manoeuvering data.

The guidance incorporated under the Resolution 1 adopted by the Conference on the
Training and Certification of Seafarer’s (STCW), 1978 which states:
“The officer of the watch is the Master’s representative and his primary responsibility at
all times is the safe navigation of the ship. He should at all times comply with the
applicable regulations for preventing collisions at sea.
It is of special importance that at all times the officer of the watch ensures that an efficient
look-out is maintained. In a ship with a separate chart-room the officer of the watch may
visit the chart-room, when essential, for a short period for the necessary performance of
his navigational duties, but he should previously satisfy himself that it is safe to do so and
ensure that an efficient look-out is maintained.
The officer of the watch should bear in mind that the engines are at his disposal and he
should not hesitate to use them in case of need. However, timely notice of intended
variations of engine speed should be given where possible .He should also know the
handling characteristics of the ship, including its stopping distance and should appreciate
that other ships may have different handling characteristics.
The officer of the watch should also bear in mind that the sound signaling apparatus is at
his disposal and he should not hesitate to use it in accordance with the applicable
regulations for preventing collisions at sea.” 52

Mr. Justice Sheen in the Roseline 53 summarized the duties in the following passages
which are quoted in full:
“It is the duty of the owners to make sure that their Masters understand their duties and
understand that they are expected to run an efficient ship. The other officers must be of
adequate qualification and experience to enable the Master to carry out his duties.
In a well run ship the following precautions will be taken when navigating in reduced
visibility
1.

2.
3.
4.

The ship will be navigated at a safe speed and in addition the engine room telegraph
will be on ‘stand-by’ and the engine room will be manned for immediate response to
orders unless the engines are operated by direct control from the bridge.
The appropriate sound signals will be sounded and, whenever possible, they will be
sounded automatically.
An efficient radar watch will be maintained .An efficient watch includes long-range
scanning at regular intervals.
A look-out will be posted in a position where he can maintain a good aural look-out.

52

See also Regulation 4 of the Merchant Shipping (Certification and Watch keeping) Regulations
1982, S.I.1982, no. 1699.
53
(1981) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 410
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5.
6.

Navigation lights will be exhibited
In waters in which safe navigation of the ship requires frequent and accurate fixing of
her position and the alterations of course, there will be on the bridge two competent
officers, one of whom will be the Master or a senior officer. This will enable one
officer to concentrate on plotting the position of the ship while the other keeps a radar
watch.”

In an action for breach of statutory duty 54 , as in an action for common law
negligence, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the causal connection between
the breach of duty and the damage. He/she may also prove that the duty is owed to
him or the injury is of the kind which statute is intended to prevent.

While the Master or the navigating officers are usually the persons guilty of fault
which causes the collision, the ship owner may negligently allow his ship to navigate
in a defective or inefficient state as regards her hull or equipment. Where a collision
happens which would not have occurred but for the defective condition of the ship,
the ship owner is liable.

In must be noted that the Maritime Conventions Act 1911, abolished the statutory
presumption of fault of a vessel infringing the Collision Regulations because it is
quite possible that the infringement of the regulations did not cause the collision 55
Thus, a breach of a statutory duty may not necessarily be the cause of collision56 . For
instance, a vessel navigating in the wrong lane in a traffic separation scheme may not
be held liable for the collision. 57
54

It is a question of interpretation of the statute and whether the duties must be carried out in all
events or merely that the person upon whom the duty is imposed is to use due care in performing it.
55
The Estrella (1977) I Lloyd’s Rep.525, The Genimar (1977) 2 Lloyd’s Rep.17
56
In the United States the ‘Pennsylvania Rule’ derived from the Pennsylvania case 86 U.S.125 (1873)
Where it was decided that:” When a ship at the time of a collision is in actual violation of a statutory
rule intended to prevent collisions. The burden rests upon the ship of showing not merely that her fault
might not have been one of the causes, or that it probably was not, but that it could not have been.”
In Hellenic Carrier (1984) AMC 2713, the court found that Hellenic Lines had met its burden under
the ‘Pennsylvania Rule’ by showing that the absence of fog signals could not have contributed to the
collision.
Another feature of American Law is that violating the collision rules gives rise to the presumption of
fault. In Louisiana v. M.V.Testbank (1984) AMC 112, at p.124, it was stated that :”Violation of the
(Collision) Rules raises a presumption , the party against the violator. In order to rebut the
presumption, the party against whom the presumption is invoked must prove not only that such fault
probably did not, but that it could not have contributed to causing the collision.”
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Even with the existence of the Collision Regulations 1972 in which all contracting
states and their ships are binding to, should adhere, there is still a gap of unidentified
elements within the regulations itself which require a seaman or a navigator to
practice good seamanship in construing and complying with the COLREGS. This
standard of good practice of seamanship is rarely identified in literature and thus it
all lies within the prudent navigator to judge and take appropriate actions to avoid
collision at sea.

The next chapter would therefore be dedicated to identify and analyze the elements
of good seamanship in selected important regulations and bringing to light the
necessity to apply good seamanship while complying with the COLREGS.

57

In the collision case between Genimar and Larry L - quoted in page 14 Chapter 2
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CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS OF THE COLLISION REGULATIONS
(Identifying the Good Seamanship aspects)

4.1 Rule 5 - Lookout
Rule 5 of the Collision Regulations 1972 relatively connects to the STCW
Convention. According to Section A VIII /2 (Watch keeping arrangements and
principles to be observed) Part 3-1 (Principles to be observed in keeping a
navigational watch) Rule 12 of the STCW, the officer in charge of the navigational
watch is the master’s representative and is primarily responsible at all times for the
safe navigation of the ship and for complying with the COLREGS 1972. Furthermore
Rule 13 and 14 of the same Part states (Lookout):
“In Rule 13, A proper look out shall be maintained at all times in compliance with the
Rule 5 of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea and shall serve the
purpose of:
1. Maintaining a continuous state of vigilance by sight and hearing as well as by all other
available means, with regard to any significant change in the operating environment;
2. Fully appraising the situation and the risk of collision, stranding and other dangers to
navigation; and
3. Detecting ships or aircraft in distress, shipwrecked persons, wrecks, debris and other
hazards to safe navigation.
In Rule 14, the look-out must be able to give full attention to the keeping of a proper lookout and no other duties shall be undertaken or assigned which could interfere with that
task.”

Both Rule 5 of COLREGS and Rule 13. 1. of STCW Convention requires the use of
all available means in order to ensure a proper lookout. In the time of sailing ships a
watch keeping seaman was placed at the top of the mast in the crow’s nest equipped
with a long glass 58 . Today there are many more nautical aids available to find out
where other ships are, where one’s own ship is 59 , and additionally the alteration of
course 60 . The most common is the radar, and today even small vessels are equipped
with Automatic Radar Plotting Aids (APRA). 61 Furthermore Rule 5 also requires the
58

Binoculars - extendable
The Santander [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 77.
60
The Golden Polydinamos (1993) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 464, 477
61
“It is an IMO SOLAS requirement that all ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards shall be fitted
with an automatic tracking aid to plot automatically the range and bearing of targets. The IMO
59
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use of shore-based radar systems. In the case The Nordic Ferry 62 a pilot was obliged
to use a shore-based radar system because in thick fog the ship’s radar did not work
efficiently. In the House of Lords, Sheen J. advised:
“The pilot “could have sought advice from the fog watch pilot on duty in the Harwich
harbour operations room…this would have been better than navigating without assistance
and proceeding down the channel on the wrong side.”

But the VHF radio or the automatic pilot should only be relied on in a limited
manner. To depart from the COLREGS by agreement on the VHF about a special
right of way leads to confusion rather than clarifying a situation 63 .

The circumstances govern the way to fulfill the obligations of Rule 5 COLREGS.
These circumstances may require stationing a watch keeping seaman at the fore end
of the ship 64 , at the upper bridge 65 or astern. 66 The choice of what a master in general
has to consider is inter alia connected to the following factors:
1. Visibility, sea state, and weather;
2. Traffic density;
3. Traffic separation schemes and routing schemes;
4. Additional workload;
5. Fitness for duty 67 ;
6. Knowledge of and confidence in the crew;
7. Experience of watch keeping officers;
8. Activities taking place on board;
9. Operational status of bridge equipment manoeuvring controls and characteristics;
10. Size of the ship and the field of vision;
11. Layout of the bridge.

carriage requirement (Regulation 19, Chapter V of the International Convention of the Safety Of life
At Sea) that ARPA should be fitted on all ships of 10,000 gross tonnage and upwards.” Captain
N.Cockroft in Marsden, A., page 6- Caph.1
62
The Nordic Ferry (1991) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 591. The Bovenkerk (1973) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 63. Such
reliance on shore based radar should be exceptional, as shore based radar cannot indicate the relative
bearings of the vessels in question. Marsden pp 6-139.
63
The Maloja II (1993) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 48, 52
64
The British Confidence (1951) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 615 621
65
The Dea Mazella (1958) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 10,21
66
For example, the look out ought to be maintained on a vessel being overtaken during the entire
process, until the overtaking vessel is passed and clear. The Iran Torab (1988) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 38,43
67
Merchant Shipping Notice No.M.1102 of UK (1984) advises, moreover, that a relieving officer or
crewman or look out should not take over the watch until his vision is fully adjusted to the light
conditions.
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Poor look out on occasions has been regarded as main causes to many collisions. In
The Da Ye 68 , Sheen J., said:
“….It will be observed that the answer assumes that Da Ye was keeping an efficient radar
lookout. She was not.
If Popov had been keeping a proper lookout it would have been seen that although a
close-quarters situation was developing the ships would have passed each other starboard
to starboard. No engine action was then necessary.
It was that alteration of course which created the risk of collision. It was a very serious
fault, which seems to have been the result of a bad lookout. The fault in the navigation of
Popov was not reacting correctly to an emergency thrust upon her. Her master is entitled
to be judged leniently.
I have come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs (Popov) must bear 20 per cent of the
blame for this collision and the defendants (Da Ye) must bear 80 per cent.”

In the Queen Mary, 69 Lord Porter said:
“The look out on the Curacao was obviously faulty. Taking the facts as found by the learned
judge, even without modifications which I have suggested, she ought to have realized
immediately the Queen Mary steadied on her course of 131 degrees, that the other vessels
were converging at an angle of not less than two points, and ought at once to have taken
steps to alter to starboard not less than two points.”

In the same case, Lord Merriman expressed the following opinion:
“It is a commonplace to say that the question of faulty lookout must be judged
objectively and not subjectively. So far as the responsibility of the ship collectively is
concerned, it is of no avail for one officer to excuse himself for a defective appreciation
of the situation by the failure of another responsible officer to furnish him with the data
for a proper appreciation.”

If a ship is proved to have been negligent in not keeping a proper look out, he/she
will be held answerable for all reasonable consequences of his/her negligence; thus
for example, it may be negligence not to see and avoid another ship on a clear night
even if that other ship has no lights. If, however, the absence of proper look out
clearly had nothing to do with the collision, it will not be deemed to be a fault
contributing to the collision. 70

68

The Da Ye (1993) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 30,38
(1949) 82 Ll. L. Rep. 303, 320.
70
The Glucometer II and St. Michael (1989) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 54, 58.
69
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In The “Sea Star” 71 a collision occurred between Horta Barbosa and the Sea Star in
the Gulf of Oman. At that time, Horta Barbosa was in ballast and the Sea Star was
fully laden with crude oil. Visibility was good. Both vessels had their radar in use
which disclosed the presence of the other at 14 to 16 miles. They could also see the
masthead lights of each other at a substantial distance and would have had a warning
of the other’s course eight miles away either by eye or binoculars. The courses of the
vessels were nearly reciprocal with a variation of two or three degrees and the speed
of both vessels was about 16 knots.

The second officer was on watch on Horta Barbosa and her automatic steering was
on 324 degrees. Before the collision, the cadet on the lookout, who had also been on
the bridge left, to call the relief. When Sea Star was about three to four miles away,
the second officer thought she would pass safely at one mile distance. He therefore,
left the bridge for the charthouse to get a radar fix.

The cadet on the lookout returned to the bridge and saw that Sea Star was on a
crossing course. He then called the second officer, who altered the steering to manual
and ordered the engines full astern. The collision took place at once. The Sea Star
was destroyed by fire and eleven of the crewmembers lost their lives.

It was held by the learned Judge Brandon, J. that the Sea Star was seriously to blame
for altering course to starboard at an improper time. This improper manoeuvre was
caused by previous defective lookout or defective appreciation of the situation, or
both. Horta Barbosa was also to blame for not taking proper avoiding action. It was
negligent of her second officer to go to the chartroom and remain there for six to
seven minutes before the collision. He should have remained in the wheelhouse or on
the starboard wing of the bridge, watching the approach of Sea Star. Apportionment
of blame was Sea Star 75 percent and Horta Barbosa 25 percent.

71

(1976) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 115. Appeal by Sea Star was dismissed, see (1976) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 477
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The duties of the person on look-out: Apart from keeping a vigilant lookout, he must
keep the officer in charge fully informed. He must report not only lights and whistles
but any movement of vessels which may affect his own course. He reports
occurrences and leaves the decision to the Master. The person on lookout should not
leave his post even for a short time and in principle he must have no other duties to
perform. 72
The Golden Mistral 73 is a case where the overriding cause of the collision was a bad
lookout on both vessels, neither vessel saw the other until one minute or less before
the collision. Sheen, J. had the following to say:
“If a good look-out had been maintained aboard Andhika Patra it would have become
apparent that Golden Mistral was not taking appropriate action in compliance with the
regulations long before the moment when Andhika Patra took action. In such
circumstances it would have been correct for Andhika Patra to take action immediately.
Andhika Patra was proceeding down the wrong side of the fairway towards a bend, in
the vicinity of which the arc of vision for an inward-bound ship on its correct side of the
fairway was restricted to some extent; that was unseamanlike.”

4.2 Rule 09 - Narrow Channel
Defining Narrow Channel has been a difficult task. It has never been specified to be
within a specific length or breadth. It may be formed by the extremities of two
breakwater at the entrance to a harbour, or two line of mooring buoys. A two mile
wide safety fairway in the Gulf of Mexico and a channel four miles wide between
Duncansby Head and the Skerries has been held not to be narrow channels. 74
The following are among the many waters which have been held or accepted, in or
near the particular place in which a collision occurred, to be narrow channel: the
Bosporus 75 , the Rive Maas 76 , the River Parana 77 , the Easthem Channel in the Port of
Liverpool 78 , the Mae Nam Chao Phraya 79 , The Danube. 80
72

Mankabady, Samir, The law of collision at sea, Holland: Elsevier Science Publishers, 1987, p.108
(1986) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 407
74
The En Gedi (1986) A.M.C. 2016, The Anna Salen (1954) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 475
75
The Elazig (1972) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 355
76
The Adolf Leonhardt (1973) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 318; and The Oldekerk (1974) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 95
77
The Martin Fierro (1974) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 203
78
The City of Leeds (1978) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 346
73
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In The Sedgepool 81 , Willmer, J. said:
“As I understand the law, one of the determining factors in deciding whether a given
area is or is not within the Narrow Channel Rule is the way in which a seaman in fact
regards it and behaves in it.”

An area should only be considered as narrow if the State, port 82 or harbour authority
declares it to be narrow. Such a declaration should be published in the navigational
documents or included in the local rules so that mariners will be aware of it and act
accordingly.
In the Martin Fierro 83 , a collision occurred between Joaquin Ponte Naya and
Martin Fierro in the River Parana. It was held that Joaquin Ponte Naya was at fault
for navigating on the wrong side of the channel and for failing to sound one short
blast when altering course to starboard. Martin Fierro was also at fault for excessive
speed and for putting her wheel hard to port. Apportionment of blame: Joaquin
Ponte Naya 85 percent and Martin Fierro 15 percent 84
Interaction between ships contains important information on this subject and
therefore it would be useful to quote extensively from it.
“…there have been casualties involving British ships where hydrodynamics interaction
was a major contributory factor. Situations in which hydrodynamics interaction is
involved fall into two main categories. The first concerns ships which are attempting to
pass one another at very close range. This is usually due to their being confined to a
narrow channel. The second concerns which are necessarily manoeuvring in very close
company for operational reasons.

In the first Category there are two situations: (a) overtaking and (b) the head – on
encounter.
79

The Toluca (1981) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 548
The Satyam Padam (1985) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 338.
81
(1956) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 668
82
In the Toluca (1984) 1 Lloyd’s Rep . 131, it was stated that Toluca was 3 ft. longer than the largest
ship that was normally permitted to enter the port of Bangkok. Therefore, special permission to pass
through the channel had been obtained.
83
(1974) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 203
84
Appeal by the owners of Martin Fierro and a cross appeal by the owners of Joaquin Ponte Naya
were dismissed, (1975) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 130. The court of appeal said that in addition to the faults
found by the trial judge, Joaquin Ponte Naya was at fault; in deviating to port and in going hard to
starboard late. Martin Fierro was at fault for failing to alter course to starboard before Joaquin Ponte
Naya opened her green lights. Both vessels also had not been observing each other movements in
ample time.
80
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a)

Overtaking. Interaction is most likely to prove dangerous when two ships are involved
in an overtaking manoeuvre. One possible outcome is that the ship being overtaken may
take a sheer into the path of the other. Another possibility is that when the ships are
abeam of one another, the bow of each ship may turn away from the bow of the other
causing the respective sterns to swing towards each other. This may also be
accompanied by an overall strong attractive force between the two ships due to the
reduced pressure between the underwater portions of the hull. There are possibilities but
the effect of interaction on each ship during overtaking manoeuvre will depend on a
number of factors including the size of one ship relative to the other, the smaller of the
two ships feeling the greater effect.
b)
The head – on encounter. In this situation, interaction is less likely to have a
dangerous effect as generally the bows of the two ships will tend to repel each other as
they approach. However, this can lead indirectly to a critical situation. In many cases the
vessel will already be altering to starboard assuming that a normal port to port pass is
intended), when the effect is to increase the swing, probably causing port helm to be
applied to check it; if the ship has now approached the edge of the channel and feels
bank rejection forward or bank suction aft, a marked and possibly uncontrollable port
sheer will develop...
In the second category , where ships are manoeuvring at close quarters for operational
reasons, there is most potential danger when one of the ships is a good deal larger than
the other, and this most commonly occurs in normal merchant service operations when a
ship is being attended by a tug. A dangerous situation is most likely when a tug, having
been steaming alongside the ship, moves ahead to the bow as when preparing to pass or
take a tow line. Due to changes in drag effects, especially in shallow water, the tug has
first to exert appreciably more ahead power than she would use in open water to
maintain the same speed and this effect is strongest when she is off the shoulder. At that
point also, hydrodynamics forces tend to deflect the tug’s bow away from the ship and
attract her stern; but as she draws ahead the reverse occurs, the stern being strongly
repulsed and the increased drag largely disappears.
It is thus a strong tendency to develop a sheer towards the ship to counter the previous
effect. If it is very smartly reversed and engine revolutions very quickly reduced, the tug
may well drive herself under the ship’s bow. Further , another effect of interaction arises
from the flow around the larger ship acting on the underbody of the smaller vessel
causing a consequent decrease in effective stability, and thus increasing the likelihood of
capsize if the ships touch. Since it has been found that the strength of hydrodynamics
interaction varies approximately as the square of the speed, this sort of manouevre
should always be carried out at very slow speed. If ships of disparate size are to work in
close company at any higher speeds then it is essential that the smaller vessel keeps
clear of the hazardous area off the other’s bow.” 85

85

Mankabady, Samir, The law of collision at sea, Holland: Elsevier Science Publishers, p.173
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4.3 Rule 13 Overtaking
Rule 13 is concerned with a vessel proceeding in the same general direction as the
other and applies to vessels in sight of one another 86 .It requires the overtaking vessel
to keep out of the way and overtaken vessel to hold course and speed. The overtaking
vessel has the option of passing on either side of the overtaken vessel, subject to the
reservation that in narrow channel the overtaken vessel should be on the right-hand
side of the channel.

Rule 13 continues to apply until all danger of collision is over. It is not enough that
the overtaking vessel has got slightly in the lead, but Rule applies until the
overtaking vessel is past and clear. The duty of the overtaking vessel is mainly to
keep out of the way of the vessel being overtaken. No special signals are required
except in a narrow channel 87 .

Although there is no express reference to the need for a risk of collision, it seems that
this is a condition of the application of the rule, 88 although it has been held by the
court of Appeal that it can apply before this, as long as there is an element of
proximity between the vessels i.e. as soon as it could be said that the overtaking
vessel was “coming up with” the vessel to be overtaken 89 . “It may, on the other hand,
be that, when there is no risk of collision at the time (of overhauling)-if, for example,
the vessel comes within sight of a sidelight at a considerable distance- the crossing
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Rule 13 applies in open sea as well as in narrow channels.
In a narrow channel, where the overtaken vessel has to take action to permit safe passing, a proposal
to pass to starboard is signalled by two prolonged and short blasts, and two prolonged and two short
blasts for passage to port.
88
The Auriga (1977) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 384,393, per Brandon, J.:
“In determining whether such risks exist in any particular case it is necessary to take all the
relevant circumstances into consideration. Of these the most important will normally be the distance
between the two ships, the speed at which one is gaining on the other, and the lateral distance at which
the faster ship is shaping to pass the slower ship. In connection with the last of these matters, it will be
material to know , among other things, whether the courses of the two ships are diverging, converging
or substantially parallel”
89
The Nowy Sacs (1976) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 682; (1977) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 91,98 (CA). For criticism of this,
see P. Mukherjee, “Overtaking or Crossing: Judicial interpretation and the Mariner’s Dilemma” 23
J.M.L.C. (1992) Asp. M.C.364
87
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rule comes into force (if the vessels’ courses subsequently cross with risk of
collision).”

90

If there is any doubt, rule 13(c) operates to trigger the rule’s

application. 91

The overtaking vessel must keep a safe distance away. In the Kylix and the
Rustringen 92 , a collision took place in darkness and clear weather between Kylix and
Rustringen. The stem of Kylix, which was proceeding at considerable speed, struck
the starboard side of Rustringen forward of amidships at an angle of about 80
degrees leading forward on the latter vessel. Kylix was held to be at fault because her
navigating officers made erroneous estimates of both the relative course and distance
of Rustringen. Those errors were made because the officers relied solely on visual
observations instead of making use of the radar.

As for the overtaking , the court said that there was nothing improper for Kylix to
overtake Rustringen in the place or at the speed or on the side of that ship, provided
she had done so at a safe distance-.However , Kylix had attempted to overtake
Rustringen too close on a converging course. Rustringen was also at fault for her bad
look-out and for her failure to keep her course and speed. The apportionment of
blame was held to be: Kylix, 80 percent, Rustringen , 20 percent 93 .
An important case to illustrate the overtaking rules is the The Nowy Sacz 94 , where
the collision took place in the Atlantic Ocean south of Cape St.Vincent between
Olympian and Nowy Sacz . Both vessels were proceeding on about parallel courses in
a northerly direction. The night was clear and the visibility good. At about 0245hrs,
90

The Moliere (1893) Asp. M.C.364
Marsden, Marsden on Collision at Sea,12th. edition, London: Sweet & Maxwell,1998, p.204
92
(1979) 1 Lloyd’s Rep.133
93
In the Ercole (1977) 1 Lloyd’s Rep.516, an appeal was made on the ground that the crossing rule
was not applied. Counsel for Ercole said that she was the stand –on ship and the Greek ship Embiricos
was the give way ship. He added that the Greek ship ought to have kept out of the way of the other.
Instead of that, she kept on course at full speed. The court of Appeal (1979) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 539, did
not accept this argument because of the fact it was not a crossing but it was a case governed by the
rules of navigation in restricted visibility.
94
(1976) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 682
91
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when Olympian was bearing 25 degrees to 30 degrees abaft the starboard beam of
Nowy sacz, the second officer of Nowy Sacz was seeing the masthead light of
Olympian but not her red light some three miles away. At the same time the second
officer of Olympian had not yet observed any lights of Nowy Sacz.

By 0300 hrs, when the bearing of Olympian from Nowy Sacz ceased to be more than
two points abaft the beam, the second officer was seeing the red light of Olympian as
well as her masthead lights. The second officer of Olympian also saw the masthead
lights and the green lights of Nowy Sacz.

Owing to the relative courses and speed of the two ships-the closing speed being
between two and three knots – the time at which risk of collision arose was about
0330 hrs, when Nowy Sacz was on Olympian’s port beam and appeared to be closing
on a crossing course from port to starboard at an angle of 25 degrees to 30 degrees.
On hearing a signal of one short blast from the Olympian which was the about onetwo cables away, the second officer of Nowy Sacz put her engines first half, then full
astern and sounded three short blast. Olympian’s master put her engines to stand-by,
ordered one short blast, and put her wheel hard to starboard. Shortly afterwards at
0357 hrs a collision occurred between the stem of Nowy Sacz and the port quarter of
Olympian at an angle of about 10 degrees.

Brandon, J. rejected the contention that the situation was an overtaking one and held
that it was a crossing situation. Nowy Sacz should have kept out of the way of
Olympian. The latter as the stand–on vessel should have kept her course and speed.
Accordingly, Nowy Sacz was three quarters to blame and Olympian one-quarter.
On appeal, the court 95 said:
“The overtaking rule applies before there is a risk of collision. However, this does not
mean that it necessarily comes into effect as soon as the vessels are in sight of one
another. The overtaking rules begin to operate as soon as it could properly be said that

95

(1977) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 91
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the overtaking ship was coming up 96 with the overtaken ship. When exactly that will be
may not always be easy to determine but we see no reason to suppose that it will be any
more difficult that the decision as to when the situation involves a risk of collision.” 97

Although the court of appeal approved Brandon, J. that the risk of collision arose in
this case at about 0337 hrs, it considered the situation as overtaking. Nowy Sacz was
the stand-on ship and Olympian was the give way ship. It apportioned the blame;
Nowy Sacz - one quarter and Olympian - three quarters.

A vessel which is overtaking another vessel is required to keep out of the way and to
pass at a safe distance. The overtaking vessel is not required to avoid crossing ahead
of the other vessel but altering course, or reducing speed; in order to pass astern of
the vessel being overtaken may be the safest form of avoiding action. The overtaking
vessel is also required to take action at an early stage. If action is not taken in good
time there is a danger that the vessel being overtaken may take action which could
confuse the situation.

A power drive vessel which approaches another power driven vessel from a direction
approximately 22.5 degrees abaft her beam may be in doubt as the whether the vessel
is an overtaking vessel or a crossing vessel. There should not be any doubt at night
because a crossing situation is indicated if a side light is seen, but the aspect cannot
be determined accurately by day. Rule 13 (c) requires such vessel to assume that she
is overtaking and keep out of the way. As the other vessel may ascertain that a
crossing situation exist, and take action to avoid crossing a vessel from her own
starboard side, the vessel which is to starboard should preferably turn on to a parallel
course and subsequently pass ahead. 98
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In the case of Transhawaii and Republica de Columbia (Columbia) in the Gulf of
Mexico where Republica de Columbia was overtaking the Transhawaii at a very
close distance and then the steering gear broke down and both the vessel collided. It
might be debatable that Transhawaii’s failure to keep Columbia under constant close
observation until Columbia was so far ahead as no longer to be an immediate threat.
Transhawaii had the option of increasing the passing distance if she regarded it as
uncomfortably close.

In the United States, the courts have taken a consistently clear position that the
overtaking vessel in inland waters must pass at a safe distance. In some early
decisions yet to be successfully challenged, the courts were adamant that this was a
duty the overtaking vessel could not avoid. In this case of the Narraganset the court
stated; true, it is not the duty of a faster vessel to remain behind when the faster
vessel overtakes a slower one, but, if she takes upon herself the risk and hazard of
passing, the overtaking vessel must choose a safe and sufficiently wide place where
it may be done with safety to both.” Justice Holland, in the case of Sif, took the
position that when Sif collided with Murcia while overtaking that vessel “it was Sif’s
duty to pass at a safe distance and at a safe point.” When the steamer Gulftrade
collided with Tarus while overtaking, The United States Supreme Court held that,
“There is ample room for the Gulftrade to pass. But if not, Gulftrade should have
slowed down and kept at a safe distance. 99 ”

When such an unambiguous stance has been adopted in respect to a safe distance in
inland waters, it would seem that logic demands no less forceful a posture on the
high seas, In the book A Guide to the Collision Avoidance Rules, Cockroft and
Lameijer have summed up the situation succinctly: “ It would be good seamanship to
move away as afar as it is safe and practicable, from the side of the fairway in which
the overtaking vessel intends to pass, to allow a greater passing distance, and
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furthermore to reduce speed in order to decrease the period of running closely
parallel to each other.

If the navigation of the vessel or other necessary duty is of such urgency that it
cannot be delayed when a passing ship is approaching and requires constant attention
until clear, then that situation requires another officer on the bridge since the keeping
of a proper look-out can never be relegated to second place. The 2nd.Mate of
Transhawaii learned that to his sorrow.

In apportioning the fault in this case, the Court first of all considered the condition of
the steering gear, the failure of which precipitated the collision. A month before this
casualty a similar failure had occurred when the vessel was approaching Santa Maria,
Colombia. The vessel was only able to complete that voyage on that occasion by
recourse to the trick wheel on the stern.

The service man that was called in to correct the fault was unable to determine the
cause of the failure but found two blown fuses, the replacement of which restored
steering. While it should have been apparent to all concerned that the original fault
that caused the failure had not been dealt with, both the service man and the owner’s
representative seems content to let the matter rest. The court took a very grave view
of this, holding that this lack of diligence rendered Republica De Columbia
unseaworthy and she was hence unable to limit her liability in respect to the claims
of cargo. Taking this grave defect into account and subsequent mistakes of the
1st.officer following failure of the steering system, Republica de Columbia was held
liable for 82½ percent of the damages. The failure of the 2nd.Mate of Transhawaii to
keep a proper look-out rendered her liable for the remaining 17½ percent. 100

Where a vessel is being overtaken by another and it becomes obvious that the
distance at passing will be inadequate, the overtaken vessel could and probably
100
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should attempt to communicate with the overtaking ship so that a satisfactory
agreement on passing can be reached. Where language is not a problem, then that can
be probably be done most easily by VHF radio. In clear weather, the initial contact
can be made by a series of rapid flashes on the blinker or Aldis lamp 101 . If no
response is forthcoming by the time the overtaking vessel is within a mile and she
has made no course change to widen the passing distance, it could be inferred that
the ‘vessel required to keep out of the way is not taking appropriate action.’ The
stand-on (overtaken) vessel now would be allowed, on the grounds of good
seamanship, if shoal water or other traffic does not interfere, to alter course so as to
widen the separation between the two vessels. Indeed , it would be both prudent and
practical to do so since with this new provision slowing such action, a vessel
involved in a collision such as these under investigation here, might be held to share
the blame for failure to haul off when there was nothing to prevent it. 102

4.4 Rule 14 Head - on Situation
The requirement that every vessel that has to keep out of the way should avoid
crossing ahead no longer applies, so vessels meeting starboard to starboard so as to
involve risk of collision should make an early and substantial alteration to starboard
to achieve port to port passing.

If one vessel sees the other end on the starboard bow, as shown in the figure, both
vessels may be tempted to alter course to port. Such action would not be in
accordance with the general principles of the Rules. The vessel with the other on her
starboard side is required to keep out of the way by Rule 15 (Crossing Situation) and
should preferably alter course to starboard to avoid crossing ahead of the other vessel,
with respect to her course made good.
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wind
Course made good

Figure 3: Actions taken based on heading and not course made good

In an American case two vessels started on reciprocal courses off the fairway buoy at
the entrance to the Galveston Channel and one of them altered course to port instead
of starboard, in breach of the 1972 Collision Regulation Rule 14. 103

All parties agree that the actions of the Mason Lykes crew were "unbelievably
stupid," as plaintiffs' expert, Captain Richard Patterson, testified. Due to the lack of
visibility, both the speed and direction of the Mason Lykes were the result of
negligent navigation of Mason Lykes crewmen. The Court finds that the vessel was
traveling too fast and its port course was exceedingly dangerous, violations of
navigational rules. In addition, the crew was negligent in not adequately plotting the
position of the Amoco Cremona, another rule violation. Such navigational negligence
presumptively caused the collision and consequent damages.

The Court also finds that the crew of the Amoco Cremona was slightly negligent in
not clearly and decisively changing course so that its direction would be obvious on
the Mason Lykes's radar screen. The Court agrees with Captain Patterson's
assessment that the Amoco Cremona's course changes - 6 degrees and then 20
degrees at the speed undertaken - were insufficient to comply with the navigational
rules. Guice's 104 testimony reveals his own belief that the Amoco Cremona would
pass to his starboard. In sum, in light of the direction of the Mason Lykes and the lack
of visibility, Caiolo 105 should have ordered the Amoco Cremona to move more
103
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The navigating officer on Mason Lykes
105
The navigating officer on Amoco Cremona
104

44

decisively starboard. The Court finds this act was a violation of the navigational rules
and a cause of the collision.

Moreover, no crewman was posted on the bow of the Amoco Cremona to watch for
other vessels. This failure to have a man stand watch is also a violation of a
navigational rule and presumptively a cause of the collision. Regarding the alleged
failure of the Amoco Cremona to plot the position of the Mason Lykes, the Court
finds that the Amoco Cremona crew did adequately plot the Mason Lykes' position.
The Amoco Cremona crew knew the direction of the Mason Lykes and attempted to
avoid the ensuing collision by going further starboard. Captain Patterson noted that,
to make a thorough radar plot, the Amoco Cremona needed to remain in a constant
direction. The Court finds that this action appears in conflict with the recommended
avoiding action.

Regarding the alleged failure of the Amoco Cremona to communicate with the
Mason Lykes, the Court finds that the Amoco Cremona attempted to call twice but
received no response. The Court finds no negligence on the part of the Amoco
Cremona's crew concerning its attempt to communicate with the Mason Lykes.
In sum, the Court finds that navigational negligence was committed by the crews of
both vessels and apportions it as follows: Mason Lykes, 90 percent; Amoco Cremona,
10 percent.
In The Ballylesson 106 , the Court found that Ballylesson was in breach of both the
Mersey Channel Rules and the Rules on Head – on situation (Rule 14). In this case,
the collision occurred, at night, in the River Mersey.

At 0602 hrs Ballylesson, which had crossed from her starboard side of the channel,
was making for the entrance to Graston Channel when the masthead lights (in line)
and sidelights of Belgulf Union were sighted bearing ahead distant about 1.25 miles.
106
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At 0603 hrs Ballylesson’s Master ordered port wheel, engines full ahead and sounded
a two short blasts signal ( not heard by Belgulf Union) ( Ballylesson then had
Pluckington Bank Buoy abeam to port at 500 feet’s). At 0604 hrs Ballylesson’s
engines were put slow ahead. At 0605 hrs one short blast signal by Belgulf Union
was heard by Ballylesson and her Master ordered hard to starboard, and gave one
short blast signal (not heard by Belgulf Union). At 0605 hrs he ordered engines full
ahead. Ballylesson then heard three short blasts signal by Belgulf Union and saw her
alteration to port. The Master of Ballylesson put her engines full astern and sounded
three short blasts. At 0606 hrs the pilot of Belgulf Union ordered emergency full
astern and sounded three short blasts signals. The collision occurred about half a
minute later between the stem of Belgulf Union and port side aft of Ballylesson at an
angle of about 60 degrees, leading aft on Ballylesson.

It was held that Belgulf Union was at fault in not seeing Ballylesson earlier, not
hearing the signals of Ballylesson and not altering to starboard thereafter. Ballylesson
was in breach of the Local rules of navigation and the head-on rule. Apportionment
of blame: Belgulf Union, two thirds, and Ballylesson one third

4.5 Rule 15 Crossing Situations
The crossing rule applies where the overtaking and head-on rules (Rule 13 and 14)
do not, where two vessels are approaching each other, other than where one is
coming up with the other from a direction more than 22.5 degrees abaft her beam or
they both on reciprocal or nearly reciprocal courses and there is risk of collision, it
does not apply in situations where there is any doubt.

When two such vessels are likely, if each keeps the course to be expected of her, to
arrive at the same point at or nearly at the same moment, they are crossing so as to
involve risk of collision, their speeds and it seems, the distance between them when
they come into sight of one another, are immaterial, except in so far as they
contribute to a state of risk of collision. This applies not only in the open sea but also
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where two such vessels are approaching from different directions, and on intersecting
courses, a buoy, lightship, headland or other point at which each must, in the
ordinary course of navigation, alter her course. 107
In The Savina 108 , the collision between two ships where one vessel leaving roadstead
at Ras Tanura and proceeding to sea. Other vessel moving from one part of roadstead
to another, both vessels had bad look-out

The collision occurred at about 2213 hrs on a dark, clear night. The Forest Hill was
beginning a voyage to Karachi, laden with crude oil, and after leaving an anchorage
in the roadstead one and a half miles to the east and slightly to the south of the Thead of the South Pier was proceeding on a course slightly to the west of north
towards the open sea. The Savina had been lying on a heading of 345 degrees at a
berth at the north end of the T-head of the South Pier, where she had taken on a part
cargo of crude oil, and, after moving away from the quay about two cables towards
the north-east, proceeded on a course slightly to the north of east with the intention
of anchoring in the roadstead, preparatory to going to the North Pier the following
day to complete her loading.

The stem and starboard bow of the Savina collided with the port side of the Forest
Hill at an angle of about 80 degrees or less, leading forward on the Forest Hill.
Mr. Justice Brandon found the most reliable guide to the times of the movements of
the Forest Hill in her engine movement book. From that book and the bridge
movement book it appeared that the anchor was aweigh at 2148 hrs and the engines
were put at slow astern for three minutes, dead slow ahead for five minutes, half
astern for two minutes, by which time, according to the master and chief officer, this
backing and filling together with wheel action had brought the ship's heading round
from about 235 degrees to 340 degrees. At 2158 hrs the engines were put dead slow
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ahead, at 2205hrs half ahead and at 2212 hrs full ahead. Meanwhile she had
continued to turn to starboard until 2205 hrs, when she steadied on a course of 350
degrees. By 2211 hrs she had reached a speed of seven to eight knots. At 2212 hrs
the engines were put to extra full ahead, and at 2213 hrs the collision occurred.

Times on the Savina were taken from the engine movement book and the scrap deck
log, the clocks being nearly synchronized. She began to move away from the pier at
2156 hrs and swung to starboard with the assistance of a tug. By 2159 hrs she was
about two cables to the north-east of the north end of the South Pier, the tug had left,
the engines had been put to slow ahead and by 2200 hrs she was proceeding with
engines slow ahead on a course of 080 degrees. At 2208 hrs the master, knowing that
he was on a crossing course with the Forest Hill, ordered the engines to be stopped
and put to emergency full astern. The collision, according to the Savina's clocks, was
at 2214 hrs.

We now turn to the evidence of the appreciation that those navigating each ship had
of the presence and movements of the other. At about 2202 hrs those on the Forest
Hill saw, off the north end of the South Pier, the masthead lights, well open, and the
green side light of the Savina, and it was appreciated that she was under way on a
course of about 080 degrees. The evidence of the master and chief officer of the
Forest Hill was that the Savina was bearing about one point forward of the Forest
Hill's port beam, but this does not fit with the evidence as to the position and heading
of the Forest Hill and was not accepted by the Judge. At some stage the chief officer
of the Forest Hill, on the instructions of his master, had three conversations with the
Savina on V.H.F. In the first of these the chief officer said that he had told the Savina
that the Forest Hill was heading for the sea on 340 degrees. altering to 350 degrees.
at dead slow ahead changing to full ahead. The radio officer of the Savina, however,
said that what he had heard was that the Forest Hill was going full ahead on a course
of 307 degrees. As to the second conversation, the chief officer of the Forest Hill
said that he had asked the Savina to stop her engines and she replied that she would
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do so. The radio officer of the Savina said that he had called the Forest Hill and said
that the Savina was going full astern and not altering course. As to the third
conversation, the chief officer of the Forest Hill said that he had asked the Savina to
go full astern and the reply was that she would do so, while the radio officer of the
Savina said that he had called the Forest Hill and said that the Savina's engines were
already working full astern. The conversations were in English, which was not the
native language of either speaker, and the Judge formed the view that the
discrepancies were the result of genuine misunderstanding.

It was at about 2200 hrs that those on board the Savina claimed to have first observed
the Forest Hill. The master of the Savina said that the Forest Hill was then showing
anchor lights, bearing about 60 degrees to 70 degrees on his starboard bow, and soon
afterwards he saw her masthead lights and green side light. (This obviously does not
correlate with the evidence from the Forest Hill.) The master went on to say that
shortly before 2208 hrs, Forest Hill suddenly opened her red light and then shut in
her green, so he ordered his engines to be stopped and put emergency full astern. He
said the astern action caused the heading of the Savina to fall off a little to port and
he put the angle of blow at 40 degrees leading forward on the Forest Hill.

The Judge made the following findings:
He found that the Forest Hill steadied on 340 degrees not earlier than when those on
board her first saw the Savina, and shortly afterwards altered to 350 degrees and
stayed on that course up to the collision. Next, having made a plot of the likely tracks
of the two ships, he found that when the Savina was first seen the Forest Hill was on
a heading of 340 degrees and the bearing of the Savina was about 3 1/2 points on her
port bow and after the Forest Hill altered to 350 degrees it narrowed to about three
points and later to 2½ points before broadening just before the collision.

The Judge accepted the plaintiffs' evidence as to when the Forest Hill weighed
anchor and switched on her masthead lights and side lights, which was well before
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the time when the Savina got on to the course of 080 degrees. Moreover, by at latest
the Forest Hill must have been showing her red light to the Savina and those on the
Savina cannot have been keeping a good look-out because of their unacceptable
evidence about the lights which they saw. As to the bearing of the Forest Hill from
the Savina, the Judge estimated, when Savina first got on to the heading of 080
degrees the bearing of the Forest Hill was about 3½ points on her starboard bow,
broadening to 6 or 6½ points and narrowing just before collision.

The Judge found the angle of blow to have been about 75 degrees., the angle
narrowing rapidly after collision and leading the master of the Savina to think the
angle of blow was as little as 40 degrees. The Judge, without claiming any precision,
estimated the place of collision as 1.25 miles from the T-head of the North Pier and
bearing 080 degrees to 090 degrees from it.

Lastly, after considering the engine movements of the two ships and consulting the
Elder Brethren, the Judge estimated the respective speeds at collision as eight knots
through the water for the Forest Hill and two knots for the Savina. On the basis of
those findings of fact (which we accept completely) the Judge held in relation to the
Collision Regulations first that the crossing rules did not apply until the Forest Hill
steadied on 350 degrees because until then she was not on a definite course at all;
secondly that when Forest Hill was steadied on 350 degrees and the Savina on 080
degrees the ships were crossing so as to involve a risk of collision. So the Forest Hill
was then the stand-on ship and the Savina the give-way ship.

The Judge found negligence on the part of the Savina in

bad look-out, not

appreciating that the Forest Hill had by then turned on to a northerly course; because
of that bad look-out, not stopping or reversing engines earlier. The plaintiffs had
contended that the Savina should have altered course to starboard but the Judge did
not accept this, considering that if the engines had been stopped or reversed earlier
this would have been enough to avoid the collision.
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The negligence found against the Forest Hill was bad look-out, not realizing earlier
that the Savina was under way and not appreciating her bearing; putting the engines
from dead slow ahead to half ahead, after steadying on 350 degrees. He acquitted the
Forest Hill of any earlier breach of the Regulations, having held that the crossing
rules did not apply earlier. In each case the Judge held that the second fault which he
had found to have occurred was the product of the first fault, the failure to appreciate
the situation properly. He found that the faults on both sides were causative of the
collision.

The Judge, having found that both ships were at fault, took the view that the positive
error of the Forest Hill in putting her engines to half ahead at a time when the Savina,
known to be under way on a course at right-angles to that of the Forest Hill, was
distant only about a mile and bearing 3½ points on the port bow was calculated to
force drastic avoiding action on the Savina, with the risk that, despite such action, a
collision would occur; and that this was more blameworthy than the omission by the
Savina, due to bad look-out, to take early action of a precautionary character to
prevent a situation which was not yet dangerous from developing into one which was.
If he was right in this assessment, he cannot have been wrong in assessing the Forest
Hill's proportion of liability at as much as 60 per cent. The question for this Court is
whether the fault of the Savina should have been found equal to or greater than that
of the Forest Hill and, if the latter, to what extent.

Darling J. contended that the learned Judge was wrong in law in holding that the bad
lookout on the Savina and the failure to stop her engines could be regarded as a
single fault instead of separate faults; in holding that the Forest Hill was not on a
course, and the crossing rules did not apply, until she was steadied on a course of 350
degrees in failing to hold that the Savina's failure to take action to keep clear of the
Forest Hill in due time was the most blameworthy and causative fault committed on
either ship.
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As to, the learned Judge found two faults on the part of each ship and in each case
held that the two faults could be treated as one because one fault (bad look-out) led
to the other (wrong action or failure to act). We do not regard this way of assessing
the faults as a decision on law: when a blameworthy course of conduct leads to a
casualty it is often possible to regard the whole of the conduct as a single fault or to
split it into various elements and call it two or more faults. If two of the elements are
entirely independent of each other it may be more logical to treat them as two faults;
if one leads to another it may be more sensible to treat them as constituting a single
fault. It is not of vital importance which way one looks at the matter because
responsibility can never be assessed simply by counting up the number of faults on
each side. In the present case the way in which the Judge dealt with the number of
faults applied similarly to both ships and in our view there was no error of law in this
respect.
In The Orduna (Owners) v. Shipping Controller, 109 , Viscount Finlay said:
“Crossing conditions continue to subsist until the vessels have definitely passed out of
phase of crossing ships. It was far too son to conclude that the vessels had passed when
the green light of Konakry got ahead of Orduna. The operation of passing was not yet
completed, and it would lead to danger and collision in very many cases if such state of
matters should be considered to constitute the position of passed ships so as to absolve
either of them from further attention to the regulations for crossing.”

Vessel should not cross the bow of another ship unnecessarily, where collision is
probable and to comply with this obligation a power driven vessel should turn to
starboard to a red light on her starboard bow approaching with risk of collision. If
local conditions render this dangerous , she may be able to get clear by turning to
port, provided her action is sufficient to keep her from crossing ahead, although that
is not as advisable a course as starboarding or, where this is adequate , slackening her
speed or, indeed, stopping or reversing and waiting. 110 Whatever action she takes, it

109
110

(1920) 5 Ll. L. Rep. 241, (1921) A.C. 250.
The Ashton (1905) p.21

52

must be seamanlike, timely and substantial, so as to leave the stand-on vessel in no
possible doubt as to what she is doing. 111

4.6 Rule 19 Conduct of Vessel in Restricted Visibility
Rule 19 applies when vessels are navigating in or near an area of restricted visibility.
The word ‘navigating’ should be noted and therefore this rule should not apply to a
ship lying dead in the water, with her engines stopped. However a vessel which stops
in the water, e.g. in a busy traffic lane, would not necessarily be considered innocent
if a collision followed.

When a vessel is proceeding in circumstances of limited visibility such as dense fog,
even though such vessel might be able to observe the vessel through the use of radar,
a vessel so proceeding is under a duty to reduce her speed when entering the fog, so
as to avoid the possibility of a collision. Rule 19 not only applies when a vessel is
navigating in an area of restricted visibility but also when she is near such an area. A
vessel which is approaching an area of restricted visibility, or which has such an area
on one side, must comply with Rule 19 and must also give the sound signals
prescribed in Rule 35.

Rule 19 in section III applies to vessels not in sight of one another in restricted
visibility whereas the Rules of Section II apply to vessels in sight of one another
whether or not the visibility is restricted. As soon as vessels navigating in or near an
area of restricted visibility come in sight of one another they must comply with the
Rules of Section II. Vessels not in sight of one another should not give the
manoeuvring and warning signals prescribed in Rule 34. 112
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Some masters may be reluctant to make appreciable reductions of speed in restricted
visibility because of pressure to maintain schedules. The attitude of owners and
marine superintendents is likely to have been affected by decisions of the Courts in
the Lady Gwendolen case. On the 10th November 1961, a collision occurred in dense
fog between the Freshfield and The Lady Gwendolen, when the Freshfield was lying
at anchor in the River Mersey. At the formal investigation held in March 1962, it was
found that the collision was solely caused by the wrongful act or default of the
Master of The Lady Gwendolen, and his certificate was suspended.

In an action brought before the Admiralty Court in June 1964, the owners of The
Lady Gwendolen sought to limit their liability. It was held that the owners were
guilty of actual fault and were unable to limit. This judgment was upheld by the
Court of Appeal. In the Admiralty Court Justice Hewson said:
“After weighing up this case and the evidence and the circumstances with what I hope is
all the care of which I am capable, I am driven to the conclusion that a total lack of sense
of the urgency of the problem posed by radar navigation in fog in Captain Meredith was a
contributory cause of the collision, and this sense of urgency and importance should have
been instilled in him from the highest level.”

In the Court of Appeal Lord Justice Sellers said:
“A primary concern of a shipowner must be safety of life at sea. That involves a
seaworthy ship, properly manned, but it also requires safe navigation. Excessive speed in
fog is a grave breach of duty, and shipowners should use all their influence to prevent it.
In so far as high speed is encouraged by radar the installation of radar requires particular
vigilance of owners.”

Lord Justice Wilmer said:
“In the course of his evidence Captain Meredith was cross examined at some length on
his log records of various previous voyages undertaken in condition of fog. This led in
the end to an admission by Captain Meredith that he had for years habitually navigated
his vessel in fog in excessive speed. Mr. Robbie (the marine superintendent) gave
evidence to the effect that on a number of occasions he had spoken to Captain Meredith,
and to the masters of the other vessels, about the problem of navigation in fog with the
aid of radar. This evidence of Mr. Robbie was, however, denied by Captain Meredith,
and was disbelieved by the learned judge. It became quite apparent from the cross
examination of Mr. Robbie that, although all the ships logs were regularly submitted to
him, he had signally failed to check the records contained therein with a view to
ascertaining how The Lady Gwendolen was being navigated in fog. It would not have
required any very detailed examination of the engine room records in order to ascertain
that The Lady Gwendolen was frequently proceeding at full speed at times when the deck

54

log book was recording dense fog. Yet this fact appeared never to have been detected by
Mr. Robbie, and consequently was never brought to the attention of Captain Meredith.”

In reference to Rule 19 (e) COLREGS 1972 , an alteration of course has been held
to be a fault in the following circumstances: a vessel hearing a two long blasts
signal 113 was negligent in going forward and altering course to starboard 114 ; a vessel
hearing the two long blasts signal was wrong to alter her helm before making sure
that, in spite of the signal, the other vessel was not changing her bearing and
distance 115 a vessel was negligent in altering course and making no reduction in
speed 116 , a vessel, whose navigating officer believed that he had ascertained the
position of the other vessel, was at fault for altering course to try to give the other
vessel more room 117 , a vessel was negligent in putting her wheel hard to starboard
when she first saw the mast head light of the other vessel118 , a vessel was negligent
when , having stopped ( in accordance with the rules), she then went on and made
two alterations of course 119 , a vessel was negligent for stopping engines and altering
course to starboard at the same time 120 , and a vessel was negligent for making first
one and then second alteration of course on hearing two fog signals from the other
vessel. 121
In the Hellenic Carrier 122 , The District Court said that the phrase “so far as
possible” makes Rule 19(d) (i) advisory instead of mandatory. Several American
courts interpreted the language of Rule 19 (d) (i) as to prohibit port turns for vessels
navigating in close quarters, in restricted visibility and not in sight of one another.
The Court of Appeal 123 agreed with the interpretation that Rule 19 (d) (i) should
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mean that: “ alterations of course to port should be avoided in situations where a
vessel has room to manoeuvre and a choice of which way to turn to avoid the risk of
collision. When vessels are manoeuvring in close quarters, there is not usually time
for each vessel to observe the action of the other and adjust its course accordingly. A
vessel if it is to adequately adjust its course to avoid the risk of collision.” The Court
concluded that the entire purpose of the collision rules and particularly its Rule 19
will be lost if it is construed to be advisory rather than mandatory.

4.7 Liberal approach in application of the Collision Regulation
The collision regulation are merely safety instructions designed for the practical use
of mariners and provides guidance on ship maneuvering and conduct at sea. Its
primary purpose is to provide guidance on how to avoid collision and to avoid risk of
collision from developing.

In reference to Rule 2 (b) which warns against a rigid interpretation which otherwise
request navigators to take all good seamanship precautions. Interpretation of this
regulation would have to be logical, reasonable, leads to the circumstances of the
particular case and should agree with the purpose of the law.

Judges, when applying the Rules and in particular the concept of good seamanship to
individual cases, enjoy discretion to evolve and restrict various duties. Although
judges do not claim the right to legislate, their judgment are ‘creative’ law with the
inevitable result that the Rules become an instrument in their hands to define a
situation, an encounter , and the action to be taken. 124 The ‘creative Judgment’ in
collision cases necessary because of the evidential difficulties involved.
In the Sea Star 125 , Sir Gordon Wilmer said:
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“This case arises out of disastrous collision which never should have happened. The
collision occurred in the open sea between two large tankers approaching each other in
fine weather on reciprocal courses. They had been aware of each other’s presence by
radar for a distance of something like 14 to 15 miles, and they had been within visual
observation of each other for something like 8 to 10 miles. Although , as I have said, they
were on more or less reciprocal courses, the two ships managed to collide at about a right
angle, causing as my Lord has said, immense damage and some loss of life,”

His Lordship added:
“I am following perhaps the unwise course already adopted by the learned judge when,
after having arrived at his conclusion, he started to speculate as to how such an
improbable collision could have happened. It is indeed difficult to see any sensible reason
why Sea Star should have taken such suicidal action:”

Lord Diplock in Black-Clawson International v. Papierwerke WaldhofAschaffenburg 126 said:
“It is for the Court and no one else to decide what words in a statute mean”

In the Avance 127 , Brandon, J. said:
“Was the Master, in allowing that interval of about one minute to elapse, guilty of
negligent delay? In order to assist me in answering that question I have asked the Elder
Brethren to advise me on two points. Firstly, was it reasonable for the Master of Avance,
when he first saw Bambara was moving ahead, to be in doubt whether she would persist
in such action in the circumstances? If so, did he act contrary to good seamanship in
waiting for about one minute before concluding that she was in fact persisting in such
action and taking avoiding action by stopping and reversing his engines? The Elder
Brethren’s advise in relation to the first point is ‘yes’ and in relation to the second point
‘no’, but it would have been wrong for him to wait for any longer than about one minute.
I have no doubt, looking at the matter with hindsight, that it would have been prudent for
the Master to take immediate action, and that it would have been much better from the
point of view of avoiding a collision, or minimizing its effect if it occurred, if he had
done so.”

Since the Rules derive from an International convention, the courts should take note
of the opinions and decisions of foreign courts 128 and also make use of the ‘travaux
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preparatoire 129 ’. In fact, the decisions of the British Admiralty court 130 are followed
by foreign courts all over the world. Uniformity of interpretation of the Collision
Rules is a fundamental goal of British Admiralty Law. 131
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CHAPTER 5
ESTABLISHING A COLLISION CLAIM
5.1 Elements of Conviction
A collision at sea may give rise to causes under statute in contract or in tort, in
salvage or in general average, In order to claim under a statute the plaintiff must be
the person to whom the statute gives a cause of action. Only a party to a contract can
claim on the contract unless a statute extends the category of persons who can sue on
the contract. A plaintiff has the right to sue in tort for injuries if he/she is the person
injured or damage to property if, when the damage occurred , he/she is the owner of
the property or is in possession of the property or has an immediate right to
possession of the property.
According to the principles of tort, collision claims are based on the requirement of
the fault of a person causing damage by his carelessness (incurred by the plaintiff).
The defendant must commit a negligent act that consists of four elements:

1) A duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff.
2) Breach of that duty.
3) That the breach caused or contributed to the collision (causation in fact).
4) It caused the damage claimed, which must not be too remote (causation in law
and remoteness of damage).
If these requirements are established, then the responsibility and the allocation of
blame have to be assessed by the following questions:

5) Whether and to what extent the defendant is blameworthy?
6) Does the fault of the defendant have “causative potency” and should it therefore
be taken into account when examining overall blame?

Not all faults are actionable in law. The three main components of fault liability are
a) Fault
b) Damage, and
c) Causation
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5.2 Fault
It's a conduct or omission to do something which a prudent seaman would do. It
involves both potency and blameworthiness or any navigational defects. It is the
failure of a prudent navigator to exercise the degrees of skill and care which are
ordinarily to be found in a competent seaman. It is also considered on the part of the
navigator not to take reasonable steps to avoid danger in navigation, and the nature of
those actions must depend on the surrounding circumstances.
In the Kapitan Aleseyev 132 , the collision took place between that vessel and
Nordmark because the anchors of Aleseyev dragged and allowed her to be blown
down towards Nordmark. Both the ships had let go their port and starboard anchors
as instructed by the pilot and both had made fast with stern lines to a bollard on the
breakwater. Once these ships were in their berths it was the duty of the Master of
each ship to take all reasonable care to ensure that his ship did not endanger or cause
damage to others. Alekseyev damaged Nordmark and in consequence the owners of
Nordmark claimed damages.

The advice of the Trinity Masters to the judge was that the Master of Aleseyev had
not omitted to take any precaution which could reasonably have been expected of
him/her. They would not have expected any Master to act in a different way. This
advice accorded with the view already formed by the Judge. Accordingly, Aleseyev
was free from any blame for the collision.133
An error of judgment may not amount to fault. In The Toluca 134 Sheen J. said
that:
“It is clear that to me that Captain… was doing his best to avoid a collision. He saw that
Toluca was in difficulty and he took the action which at that time appeared to him to be
the most helpful. The fact that in the light of after events it appears that some other action
might have been better, is not to the point. I am quite satisfied that he was exercising
reasonable skill and care.”
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5.2.1. Elements of fault
It is a standard of correct actions. When the standard falls below the standard of care
required by the circumstance of the case then it is consider to have occurred. 135 When
all other factors are in order or so to say perfect for a day without collision but the
action or inaction of a navigator had resulted in an undesired event then it is
described as fault. In the eyes of the law, the Master owes a duty to any person on
board his/her ship and to other users of the sea in respect of any collision or risk of
collision. Fault of one vessel does not excuse the fault of the other. When there is a
common or statutory duty to take care and if he/she is in breach of such a duty then
he/she would be guilty of fault.

The standard of care is that which reasonably can de demanded in the circumstances.
Lord Macmillan 136 expressed the rule in this way:
“The standard of foresight of the reasonable man eliminates the personal equation and
is independent of the idiosyncrasies of the particular person whose conduct is in
question. Some persons are by nature unduly timorous and imagine every path beset
with lions. Others, of more robust temperament, fail to foresee or nonchalantly
disregard even the obvious dangers. The Court will be looking for perfect skill and
presence of mind or cool and deliberate judgment but for an action of a reasonable man
who is presumed to be free from both over-apprehension and from over confidence. A
reasonable man or woman is also cool and collected and remembers to take precautions
for his own safety even in an emergency.”

According to Brandon J.:
“The standard of skill and care to be applied by the Court is that the ordinary mariner and
not extraordinary one, and seamen under criticism should be judged by reference to the
situation as it reasonably appeared to them at the time, and not with hindsight.”

In the Toluca 137 , Sheen J. said:
“The fact that in the light of after events it appears that some other action might have
been better is not to the point. I am quite satisfied that he (the Master) was exercising
reasonable skill and care.”
135
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Thus, the standard for deciding whether there has been a breach of duty is objective.
Too high of skill is not demanded. A mariner must exercise such care as accords with
the standards of a reasonably competent mariner at the time but he/she is not an
insurer against every accidental slip. He/she must keep himself reasonably up to date.
On the other hand, he/she is not negligent if he/she acts in accordance with the
practice accepted at the time as proper by a responsible body of professional
mariners. 138
In an action for breach of statutory duty139 as in an action for common law negligence,
the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the causal connection between the breach of
duty and the damage. He/she may also prove that the duty is owed to him/her or the
injury is of the kind which the statute is intended to prevent. While the Master or the
navigating officer are usually the persons guilty of fault which causes the collision,
the ship owner may negligently allow his ship to navigate in a defective or inefficient
state as regards her hull or equipment, where a collision happens which would not
have occurred but for the defective condition of the ship, the ship owner is liable. 140

5.3 Causation
When a breach of the Regulation or of the rules of good seamanship would be
required to be proofed in a collision case, the chain of causation or caused would
need to be formed to create a link to establish the reason for the collision to have
occurred. The claimant must generally show that the collision and the damage
resulting from it would not have happened but for the defendants fault. 141 He must
also show that the damage he has suffered would not have been of a different kind
from the sort of damage that ought to have been foreseen by the defendant.
Otherwise, the damage will be excluded from consideration as too remote. No event
138
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amounting to a novus actus interveniens must have intervened between the
defendant’s fault and the plaintiff’s damage. Events that break the chain of causation
in this way are many; they include both acts of third parties or the plaintiff himself,
and also completely extraneous events. 142
In Leyland Shipping Company v. Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society 143 Lord
Shaw said:
“To treat proxima causa as the cause which is the nearest in time is out of question.
Causes are spoken of as if they were as distinct from one another as beads in a row or
links in a chain, but- if this metaphysical topic has to be referred to it is not wholly so.
The chain of causation is a handy expression, but the figure is inadequate. Causation is
not a chain, but a net. At each point influences, forces, events, precedent and
simultaneous infinitely. At the point where these various influences meet, it is for the
judgment as upon a matter of fact to declare which of the causes thus joined at the point
of effect was the proximate and which was the remote cause.
What does “proximate” here mean? To treat proximate cause as if it was the cause which
is proximate in time is, as I have said, out of question. The cause which is truly proximate
is that which is proximate in efficiency. That efficiency may have been preserved
although other causes may meantime have sprung up which have yet not destroyed ijt, or
truly impaired it, and it may culminate in a result of which it still remains the real
efficiency cause to which the event can be ascribed.”

In The Statue of Liberty 144 Lord Reid found that Andulo’s fault in not taking more
accurate observations at the earlier stage , had no causative effect and it should be
left out of account in the final assessment of the degrees in which Andulo was to
blame for the collision.
In the Bovenkerk 145 , Brandon, J. held that the presence of the dredger while creating
the occasion of the collision was not, in law , a contributory cause of it because its
presence was well known to the pilots of both vessels.
In The Fritz Thyssen 146 , the Court found that the sinking of the vessel was not caused
by the collision but because of her failure to take necessary remedial measures. In
142
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this case, the plaintiff’s vessel Mitera Marigo laden with iron ore, sustained damage
below water line in collision at 0210 hrs on May 29, 1959, with the defendant’s
vessel Fritz Thyssen, off Ushant. Mitera Marigo refused assistance from Fritz
Thyssen and the Salvage tug, Englishman, and continued her voyage to Rotterdam.
At 0520 hrs, she altered her course for Falmouth because water was increasing in
No.1 hold. Her speed was seven knots. At 1100 hrs, she engaged Englishman as
escort and those vessels sighted each other at 1700 hrs, eleven miles from Falmouth,
but Mitera Marigo refused a tow by Englishman, Mitera Marigo was taking water
into No.1 hold at 70 to 80 tons per hour when she was towed into Falmouth Harbour
by three harbour tugs. At that time, Mitera Marigo’s owners gave her Master
authority to engage Englishman for any services required.

At 2000 hrs she was moored stern first to buoys with Englishman standing-by. At
2200 hrs, an alarming noise was heard on Mitera Marigo, and the Englishman was
asked to pump. Pumps with capacity of 400 tons per hour were started, but 45
minutes later, when Mitera Marigo cast off from the buoy, preparatory to beaching
she sank.

Karminski, J. said that if Englishman’s pump had been used at 2000 hrs, Mitera
Marigo probably would not have sunk. His Lordship held that Mitera Marigo
omitted to take vital precautions which good seamanship required and, if those
precautions had been taken two hours earlier, loss would probably have been averted.
In fact the loss of the ship was caused by the Master’s action and indecision in failing
to accept offers of assistance.

5.3.1. Burden of proof
The burden of proof that damage would not have occurred but for the defendant’s
negligence is on the plaintiff. This is important, since it follows that a plaintiff who
merely proves damage to his own ship (res ipsa loquitor) and fault in the defendant
may still fail, if the cause of the damage is unclear.
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In the Santander 147 , after a collision in the Mersey for which the defendant vessel
was found to have been to blame, it was found that the plaintiff vessel’s propeller
had been damaged prior to the collision and this had created doubt within the Court if
the plaintiff itself had also contributed to the collision. The plaintiff failed to recover
in respect of it. 148

If the plaintiff proves that a collision would not have happened but for the
defendant’s fault, but the defendants in turn alleges fault in the plaintiff amounting to
a novus actus interveniens, where does the burden of proof lie? 149
Two early decisions of Dr.Lushington, 150 not to mention dicta of Lord Haldane in
The Metagama 151 made it quite clear that , once it had been shown that damage
would not have been suffered had not the defendant been at fault, the onus was then
on the defendant to prove novus actus exculpating him. However, a strong court of
Appeal in the The Paludina, 152 and also the learned President in The Guilford 153 said
that the onus remained in this respect on the plaintiff throughout; moreover, it could
be suggested that cases such as the Metagama had really involved the principles of
res ipsa loquitur 154 .

5.4 Inevitable Accident and Agony of the Moment
Inevitable accident describes a collision which was not intended and which could not
have been foreseen and avoided by the exercise of reasonable skill and care or
ordinary diligence. To sustain a plea of inevitable accident it is not enough to show
merely that the collision was inevitable at the moment of, or for some moments
147
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before, its occurrence. It is not enough for a ship to show that, as soon as the
necessity for taking measures to avoid collision was perceived, all that could be done
was done. The question remains whether precautions should have been taken earlier.

When a breach of the duty of Collision Regulation or of the duty of good seamanship
is evident in a collision case, she cannot be heard to allege inevitable accident 155 .

To succeed in the plea of ‘inevitable accident’ it must be proved that:
a) the accident is caused by a ‘force majeure’ or an Act of God
b) All reasonable precautions have been taken : and
c) There was no fault in getting into a situation where collision was unavoidable.
The defense for ‘inevitable accident’ is usually invoked when the vessel’s movement
had been overridden by the force of nature, like a storm or by the failure of her
machinery. When the cause was the nature then it has be proved that reasonable
measures has been taken to detect the storm or measures to reduce the effect had
been taken in due time. Failure of machinery defense would only succeed if the
defect had been latent 156 and could not be discovered by reasonable diligence or
inspection. Also, he/she must establish that the collision was the result of the defect
or the breakdown and could not be avoided by proper navigational action after the
trouble had developed. 157
In the Merchant Prince 158 a vessel’s steam steering gear jammed and, in broad
daylight, she ran into a ship at anchor in the Mersey. There was no proof as to why it
jammed, the owners had taken proper care in providing and maintaining it and had
recently replaced part of the chain between wheel and rudder. The tendency of new
chain to stretch and kink being well known, however, it was negligent inter alia not
to have the hand steering gear ready for immediate use; had this been done the
155
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collision could have been avoided. The defense of inevitable accident accordingly
failed.
The Virgo 159 struck and sank the Gem, which was at anchor in the Thames in daylight.
The weather was fine and clear. The collision was solely due to the breakdown of the
former’s steering gear. On examination two small flaws were discovered in the
centre of a metal part, which had broken. The flaws were latent and the collision was
held to be due to inevitable accident.
A case where the defense of necessity in this sense succeeded is The Hessa 160 .In a
full gale in the Tyne, the Hessa found herself in dangerously exposed moorings. She
slipped them and tried cross the river to a safer anchorage on the other side, but on
the way was caught by the gale and hit and damaged the Adolf Woermann. A claim
against the Hessa failed; it was foreseeable that by slipping moorings in such
circumstances she might be driven into and thus damage another vessel, but it did not
amount to fault because she did it in the course of an attempt to escape from danger
to herself. Hill J. expressed the law succinctly:

“When a man by the fault of another is presented with choice between two perilous
courses, the comparative perils must not be too nicely weighed, nor must the choice be
held a wrong one if the course chosen does not attain its object. What is demanded of the
man who had to choose is that he should exercise judgment and discretion as becomes a
reasonable and prudent seaman.”

The fact of a ship being injured by the negligence of another does not justify those on
board in neglecting to take all reasonable measures to save her, lessen the effects of
the collision and minimize the damage. They must exhibit ordinary courage in
standing by their vessel, and show proper skill and seamanship according to the
circumstances of the case. The court, however, will make reasonable allowance for
the excitement which usually attends a collision, and those on board will not be
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expected to be so acute in their judgment, or to act with the same skill and coolness,
and if there had been no collision. 161

5.4.1 Agony of the Moment
In the Rywell Castle 162 James, C.J. Observed:
“A ship has no right, by its own misconduct, to put another ship into a situation of
extreme peril, and then charge that other ship with misconduct. My opinion is that if, in
that moment of extreme peril and difficulty , such other ship happens to do something
wrong , so as to be contributory to the mischief, that would not render her liable for the
damage , inasmuch as perfect presence of mind, accurate judgment, and promptitude
under all circumstances are not to be expected. You have no right to expect men to be
something more than ordinary men.”

When a Master is placed, through no fault of his own, in a real dilemma and has to
take one of two courses, each of which involves risks, he is not guilty of negligence
if he takes the course involving the least risk. 163 As discussed in chapter 2 on the
physiological effect during the agony of the moment, it is true to say that there is an
effect from the brain which induces the navigator to take contradicting action during
that moment because of the situation. The factors have been discussed in that chapter
and thus Court’s should take into consideration into this matter seriously and
consider that no human is perfect and no education is complete if those competencies
could not act with the right of the mind during the agony of the moment.

5.5 Trial of Liability
(The Common Law Perspective)
After the final preparations, the public trial of liability will start. The judge has to
conduct the trial, assess causative negligence respectively, the breach of collision
regulations, and to determine the facts based on the evidential procedure. Unless the
judge directed something else, the party who bears the burden of proof has the right
to start. The counsel of that party opens the trial by stating the collision case. The
161
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statement should be as far as possible uncontroversial and in any event no longer
than the circumstances require. Afterwards the advocates for each of the parties will
usually each be invited to make a short opening statement. After the opening the
court will deal with evidence matters, which are related to the pleaded and probative
facts. For the beginning of the opening the burden of proof is important, therefore,
who bears the burden of proof and the standard of that burden of proof has to be
examined.
Evidence Law is governed by the question: What facts must be proved and how will
that be done? At this stage the first one will dominate the matter of evidence and the
burden of proof always has to be related to a particular issue of fact and the relevant
substantive law has to be taken into account as the statement (in regard to burden of
proof in general) as mentioned by Lord Wensleydale in The City of London 164 :

“The party seeking to recover compensation for damage must make out that the party
against whom he complains was in wrong. The burden of proof is clearly upon him, and
he must show that the loss is to be attributed to the negligence of the opposite party. If at
the end he leaves the case in even scales, and does not satisfy the court that it was
occasioned by the negligence or default of the other party, he cannot succeed.”

At the end of the evidence procedure in regard to an issue a judge takes all the facts
and the credibility of the parties into account. The facts are provided by oral,
documentary and real evidence. Witnesses, parties or experts may provide oral
evidence. Documentary evidence includes the ship’s various documents such as the
working chart, bridge and engine movement books, deck log, radar work book and
the master’s report, sketches and Notices to Mariners. Real evidence is, for example,
peering physical objects. If he is still not convinced of an issue and hence in doubt if
the claimant sufficiently adduced evidence, the burden of proof will decide the case
(to the disadvantage of the claimant).
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5.6 Apportionment of Liability
The law requires that a seaman should exhibit ordinary presence of mind and
ordinary skill; but it is manifest that at a moment of great difficulty a man may do, or
omit to do, something which may contribute to the collision, without thereby
showing himself deficient in ordinary skill, care and nerve. A wrong step thus taken
in the agony of collision is not negligence 165 .and unless the emergency was caused
by her fault; the ship will not thereby incur liability. If a ship is to be excused for
taking a wrong step, which in fact caused or contributed to the collision, upon the
ground of sudden peril or difficulty, it must be clearly shown that she was in no way
responsible for the sudden peril or difficulty. 166 In The Winona

167

the President, Lord

Merriman, said:
“When an emergency arises and quick decisions have to be made, it may be very easy to
take wrong decision .In my opinion, the fundamental point about this case is that the look
out was faulty and this emergency never ought to have arisen. That is my opinion .I am
very far from being satisfied that there was any sort of justification for porting, though in
truth, as I think ,it really all follows from the fact that the look out was so faulty that
some emergency decision had to be taken and the wrong one was taken.”

The decision in The Bywell Castle entitles a seaman to favourable a consideration,
yet where he/she has the choice of several alternatives, any of which would as it
turns out, avoid the collision, and he/she does the one thing which is almost certain to
cause it, and this, in fact undoubtedly contribute to it, it has been held that he will not
be excused for that wrong action as being taken in the agony of collision. 168
To enable the claimant in a collision action to recover damages, he/she must prove
that his/her loss was caused by the negligence of the defendants or of some person
for whose acts he/she is responsible. With regards to the necessity of proving
negligence on the part of those against whom damages are claimed, an action for
165
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damages by collision does not, since the repeal of the statutory presumption of
fault 169 , differ from any other action for damage by negligence. The plaintiff cannot
succeed if the case is left in doubt. 170 Where a ship, or each of two ships, alleges
negligence on the part of the other, and it is manifest that the collision was caused by
fault somewhere, but the evidence does not satisfy the court on which side the fault
lies, no damages can be recovered and each ship bears her own loss. The general rule
was thus stated by Lord Wensleydale 171 :
“The party seeking to recover compensation for damage must make out that the party
against whom he complains was in the wrong. The burden of proof is clearly upon him
and he must show that the loss is to be attributed to the negligence of the opposite
party .If at the end he leaves the case in even scales, and does not satisfy the court that it
was occasioned by the negligence or default of the other party, he cannot succeed.”

Having made out a prima facie case of the negligence on the part of the defendant,
the burden of proof is shifted ,and the defendant will be liable unless he displaces the
prima facie case or shows that his negligence in no way contributed to the loss.

In the case of a collision in daylight between a ship under way and another which is
proved or admitted to be lying at anchor in a proper place, the burden is upon the
former to show that she was not in fault, for when a vessel runs down a vessel at her
moorings in broad daylight, that fact is by itself prima facie evidence of fault. 172 But
in the collision were at night the plaintiff would also have to prove, in the absence of
admission, in the first instance that the lights on his ship were burning
efficiently. 173 In the case of fog, it is for the vessel at anchor to prove that she was
sounding the appropriate fog signals in accordance with the regulations. 174 The duty
of a ship under way to avoid doing damage to a sunken ship, or to a ship ashore, is
the same as in the case of a ship at anchor, but unless a mast or some part of the
wreck is above water and, at night, properly lit, or the ship underway is in some way
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warned of the presence of the wreck, no presumption of fault would, it is conceived,
arise against the ship under way.

The Maritime Convention Act 1911 was to abolish an arbitrary rule by which any
infringement ,which by possibility might have contributed to the collision, rendered a
vessel to blame unless she could show that the departure from the regulations was
necessary, and to:
“Leave the court to follow what is a reasoning judgment and to say, ‘Did this want of
obeying the regulations in any way contribute to the collision?’ not ‘Might it possibly
have done so?’ ” 175

In the past there has tended to arise presumption against a moving vessel if the other
vessel involved is moored or anchored. To counteract such a presumption the owner
of the moving vessel would probably have had to bring conclusive evidence of one
or more of the following lapses on the part of the stationary vessel: (a) that the
anchored ship was improperly positioned; (b) that the anchored ship was unlit or
improperly lit at night ; (c) that the anchored vessel had failed to maintain a watch
where the circumstances required it; or (d) that the anchored ship had failed to take
adequate steps to avoid the collision.

Presumption of fault also used to arise when a ship’s master had breached any one of
the Collision Regulations (COLREGS).That such infringement per se should
establish prima facie fault in law could lead to injustice and this injustice was
remedied by the section 4(1) of the Maritime Conventions Act 1911 ,which abolished
the statutory presumption of fault by repealing subsection (4) of section 419 of the
Merchant Shipping Act 1894(U.K), which had provided that a ship was deemed in
fault in a case of collision where any of the Collision Regulations had been infringed
by the ship. 176
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Per Bargrave Deane J.; The Enterprise(1912) P. 207,211.
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Under Rule E of Rules for the Assessment of Damages in Maritime Collisions (1988)
also known as (“Lisbon Rules) it is stated that
“The burden of proving the loss of damage sustained in accordance with these rules shall
be upon the Claimant. Damages shall not be recoverable to the extent that the person
against whom the claim is made is able to show that the Claimant could have avoided or
mitigated the loss or damage by the exercise of reasonable diligence.”

In the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating
to Collision between Vessels, 1910 it is stated in:
Rule 3:
“If the Collision is caused by the fault of one of the vessels, liability to make good the
damages shall attach to the one which has committed the fault.”

Rule 4: First Paragraph
“If two or more vessels are in fault the liability of each vessel shall be in proportion to the
degrees of the faults respectively committed. Provided that if, having regard to the
circumstance, it is not possible to establish the degrees of the respective faults, or if it
appears that the faults are equal, the liability shall be apportioned equally”

Rule 6:
“The right of action for the recovery of damages resulting from a collision shall not be
conditional upon entering of a protest or the fulfilment of any other special formality.
There shall be no legal presumptions of faults in regard of liability for collision.”

In the 30 years (1798-1828) during which Lord Stowell presided over the Admiralty
Court he had no occasion to apply the rule of division of loss. Nevertheless, two
noteworthy cases, both of great importance in the history of division of loss cases,
were decided by Lord Stowell in this period. In The Woodrop - Sims (1815) 177 and in
The Lord Melville (1816) 178 there exist dicta with reference to the incidence of loss
in case of collision in which he categorised collisions into four classes:
a)
b)
c)
d)

177
178

where the collision is caused without fault in either ship;
by the fault of both ships;
by the fault of the plaintiff ship;
by the fault of the defendant ship.

(1815) 2 Dodson 83,85
(1816) cited in Hay v. Le Heve (1824) 2 Shaw’s Sc.App.Cas.395, at 402
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The rule of division of loss is declared to be applicable only in the second class of the
case (b) and this remains the law at the present day.
The Apportionment of liability or Division of loss is now provided for in the
Merchants Shipping Act 1995 of the United Kingdom in section 187, The Maritime
Conventions Act 1911 Section 1, Merchant Shipping Ordinance 1952(Federation of
Malaya ordinance no 70) Part XIV, Australian Navigation Act 1912 section 259,
The Norwegian Maritime Code of 24 June, 1994, No. 39 section 161 of Chapter 8,
which provides as follows:
“(1) Where, by the fault of two or more ships, damage or loss is caused to one or more
of those ships, to their cargoes or freight, or to any property on board, the liability to
make good the damage or loss shall be in proportion to the degrees in which each ship
was in fault, except that if, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, it is not
possible to establish different degrees of fault, the liability shall be apportioned equally.
(2) Nothing in this section shall operate so as to render any ship liable for any loss or
damage to which her fault has not contributed.”

Then under section 1 of the Maritime Conventions Act 1911, it is wide enough to
include
damages.

cases
179

not

involving

actual

contact

between

ships

causing

Extending the rule of division of loss to cases where there has been no

actual ‘collision’ is contemplated by the words of the 1910 Convention, Rule 13
which refers such damage as:
“By the execution or non execution of a manoeuvre, or by the non-observance of the
regulations, even if no collision had actually taken place”

The House of Lords had decided that a positive fault or act of commission is not
necessarily more blameworthy that negligent navigation or an act of omission. But
that it may be so is apparent from comparing extreme cases, for example, the
difference between negligent navigation causing a collision compared with deliberate
running down. Whether a court should attach more blame to any deliberate act
should depend upon all circumstance. 180 The fault to the degrees of which liability is
to be proportional must be fault causing or contributing to the damage. 181 In one case
the process was described as considering “the culpability and causative effect of the
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faults on either side”, 182 The position has been explained by Scott L.J. in the
following terms 183 :
“On the question of apportionment, one has to remember that the law of apportionment,
under the Maritime Conventions Act 1911, is not one of distribution of moral blame, but
of the comparative appreciation of the degrees in which the respective faults of the
vessels in fault have contributed to the results.”

The House of Lords has drawn attention to the error of apportioning fault by means of
a “ crude mathematical sum” 184 and in arriving at its apportionment of blame a court
should not ‘total up the number of faults, and when the same case was before the
Court of Appeal, Sir Gordon Wilmer L.J. said that the Admiralty Court
“…rejects the love of nicely calculated less or more”, 185 and went on to say that the
“inquiry must be qualitative rather than quantitative. It is necessary to look at the over–all
picture…”

Section 187 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 of the United Kingdom requires that
liability shall be assessed “in proportion to the degrees in which each vessel was at
fault” and the process of achieving this under the Act 1911 has been explained in the
following terms 186 :
“…the investigation is concerned with ‘fault’ which includes blameworthiness as well as
causation. And no true apportionment can be reached unless both these factors are borne
in mind”

For two ships to be held to blame both must be guilty of negligence contributing to
the loss 187 but the acts of negligence committed by the ships respectively, need not ,it
seems, be both faults contributing to the collision. The fault to the degrees of which
liability is to be proportional must be fault causing or contributing to the damage. 188
Culpability shows promise of being increasingly made the measuring stick in
apportioning collision damages in our own courts. Causation, heretofore necessary in
182
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The Way American courts looks at establishment of fault in the first place, is simply
too difficult to weigh in apportioning damages, especially when there are several
causative factors involved on each side. Perhaps British courts have summed up the
problem best, as in The Anneliese, 189 the court stating,
"the faults of the Anneliese and the Livanos, and he earlier faults of both vessels, were all
so mixed up together that it is, in my view, impossible to treat some of those faults as
causative and others as not."

Once the officer conning a vessel is found to have been negligent, that is, his conduct
fell below what is required of a reasonably prudent seaman and it is shown that the
negligence was a proximate cause of the collision, then, of course, liability must be
assigned to that vessel. The degrees of liability, however, should be apportioned on
the basis of the relative culpability, egregiousness, or blameworthiness of the parties
including that of the owner in sending the vessel to sea in her particular condition
and manned as she was.

Culpability should be based on the overall conduct of the vessels' navigators and
owners, taking into account the following factors:
1) Customs and usages of the sea;
2) The observance of all rules of the road and other statutes and regulations
for safety of navigation;
3) The level of maintenance and equipping of the vessels, i.e., their seaworthiness;
4) The shore side supervision and instruction of the officers and crew;
5) General precautions taken by all involved to avoid accidents at sea;
6) Regard for the safety of other vessels in the vicinity;
7) Whether the faults involved caused the dangerous situation to arise in the first ‘
place; and
8) The truthfulness of the vessel's officers and crew and the records they maintained.
These are not new standards by any means. The conduct of each vessel held liable
for the collision should be weighed and compared with these criteria in the allocation
of the damages. As one recent American court stated, "whether we use the term
comparative fault, contributory negligence, comparative causation, or even
comparative blameworthiness, we are merely beating around the semantical bush
189
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seeking to achieve an equitable method of allocating the responsibilities, for an
injury or loss." 190 In this regard, justice would be best served by making the more
culpable party shoulder the greater degrees of blame, if not all of it in the right
circumstances.

190

Hosei Kaiun v. Seaspan Monarch, 1981 AMC 2162, 2179 (D. Or. 1980), citing Pan Alaska
Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Construction & Design.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Maritime law generated many international and unique measurements and standards.
This also applies to collisions at sea. Long navigational of a judicial practice led to
the determination of negligence. Today international Rules and Codes accomplish
the prevention of collisions and therefore increase safety at sea. Even where
international provisions are not applicable practical necessities of shipping demand
compliance to good seamanship. The general and international principle of good
seamanship supplements the closely knitted net of international rules and prevention.
Each lawyer can refer either to the international standards or even to national
measurements as long as they are in accordance to good seamanship and thus
required by the nautical practice.

The best claim will not enjoy a happy ending if ignorance of facts bars a party from
the procedural implementation. Without comprehensive knowledge of a collision
case a plaintiff will find himself at the Danaid’s barrel 191 . English law works mainly
with the disclosure proceeding, which compels the parties to disclose all relevant
documents, according to the “cards face upon the table” principle. Moreover the
parties have to provide comprehensive the underlying facts by filing a statement of
case. Facing the pleaded and disclosed facts the solicitors (advocates) have to work
out the relevant facts (the issues) for the trial in order to catalyze the proceedings.
This leads to an early overview of the merits of the case.

The burden of representing the case substantively and the allocation of that burden
and the burden of proof (particularly the reversal of the burden of proof/shifting of
the burden of proof) takes the difficulties of pleading relevant facts into
consideration. Each party must always have a look at the pleading of his opponents
and often his burden to plead particulars will depend on his special knowledge and
191
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on the pleading of his opponent. Also the judge is involved in the enlightenment of
the merits of the case. Where a party obviously ignores issues the court bears the
obligation to point the party at the failure but duties of pointing (indication) and
warning are limited by the duty to be neutral. The overriding duty of a judge is to
ascertain the equality of arms.

The success of collision litigation (collision at sea) depends on the procedural and
tactical work of solicitors and of the availability of information and not on the
substantive law. Therefore shipping lawyers in each country must accomplish a
fundamental collection of facts of the collision and then place the facts in a
methodical way in front of the proper court.

6.1 Seaworthiness
Except in rare cases of force majeure, there is always a human action behind every
navigational incident or accident. Many accidents at sea produced by technical or
structural failures originate in lack of maintenance of equipment on board. This can
also be related to human failings. In other words, its not the direct action of human
himself could lead to a collision, it’s a condition of latent failure in which few other
considerations of the failure of the human in managing the equipment or structure
itself could lead to the same event. This condition can be categorized as the
seaworthiness of the ship. Apart from its implications in commercial maritime law,
particularly in the law of carriage of goods by sea and marine insurance, and in some
aspects of maritime labour law, it is an offence to send or take an unseaworthy ship
to sea for which penal sanctions can be imposed on a shipowner, master or other
person and the ship may be detained.
Seaworthiness connotes that vessel must be properly supplied and provisioned and
also properly equipped for navigation 192 . It must of course, satisfy all mandatory law
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regarding surveys, onboard documentation and operational standards. 193 It must also
carry a full complement of competent crew which has been adequately trained in
seamanship for its rank and in the operational and safety procedures of the ship.
One general demand is the seaworthiness of a ship. As long as the unseaworthiness
of a ship causes a collision, the shipowner of the unseaworthy ship will be faced with
liability. In the US case Tug Ocean Prince, seaworthiness was determined as;

“a relative term depending upon its application to the type of vessel and the nature of
the voyage. The general rule is that the vessel must be staunch, strong, well equipped
for the intended voyage and manned by a competent and skilful master of sound
judgment and discretion. The burden to prove seaworthiness and the exercise of due
diligence to make the ship seaworthy is upon the vessel owner or operator.”

Furthermore “the owner’s duty to use due and proper care to provide a competent
master and to see that the ship is seaworthy; any loss occurring by reason or neglect
in these particulars is within his privity.” Today the original general requirement of
seaworthiness has found access to several codifications.
Particularly the adoption of the International Management Code (ISM Code) for the
Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention 194 and the International Ship
and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) 195 focuses the topic on the maritime
radar screen.

In 1998, the IMO tried to accelerate the progress by issuing the ISM Code. The
United Nations Law of the Sea Convention and the UN Convention on the Condition
for the Registration of ships (1987) did not provide (and require) an identifiably and
accountability of shipowners and managers. This was one of the reasons the ISM
Code was drafted. But this was not the only purpose of the ISM Code.
193
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6.2 The ISM Code
The ISM Code contained a new quality concerning the attempts to improve ship
safety. It tries to deal with the human factors, because most accidents are caused by
human errors. The ISM Code requires, from the 1st of July 2002, that every ship
(which is more than 500 gross register tons) and her company have a fully
functioning Safety Management System (SMS). The company has to introduce a
concept to protect the environment, take measures on all discovered risks, and
continuous qualification of the employee to convert these measures. In doing so the
company has to assure that applicable law is observed and the directives and the
provisions of the IMO, the flag state, and the classification authorities are complied
with. In addition the company has to appoint a “designated person” in order to
identify the concrete persons who represent the management of a shipowning entity
and who are liable.

The company has to always take care of the development of these safety standards.
So each shipowner must establish and maintain “its own management regulatory
regime in respect of each vessel in its fleet.” Concerning the ship management, there
must be discoverable records. Hence accidents and emergencies must be reported.
Also, the levels of authority have to be defined and there has to be a functioning
communication system between the company, the ship, and between the crew.

These are only a few of the requirements which a ship company has to fulfill. If all
the requirements are fulfilled, then the company obtains a Safety Management
Certificate (SMC) for their vessel and the Documents of Compliance (DOC) for their
offices ashore. But ISM compliance does not stop with obtaining ISM certification,
because it should be a self-regulating system. Proper documentation of the SMS has
to be put together in a handbook for the organization of safety measures and
prevention of marine pollution.
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The master has the paramount responsibility to carry out the SMS Code. He has to
report and document all problems properly. Therefore the masters’ duty of care is
clarified and on the basis of the requirements of the ISM Code, the reports, and the
documentation it is easier to show that a ship is not seaworthy, because of the failure
of crew members or onshore management. Furthermore, inventions and technical
developments will throughout influence the determination of seaworthiness. This
duty is accompanied by the duty to operate ships by adequately educated crews,
which can run the equipment of a ship.

6.3 Novus actus interveniens
A novus actus interveniens can break the chain of causation and this reason can
support the defense of the defendant. These are events (for instance caused by the
plaintiff herself, by a third party or by nature), which cause also the damage or even
aggravate the situation of the plaintiff. For example, a defendant throws a stone into
a window and the same window would have been destroyed by the blast wave of an
explosion. Only an extraneous factor can cut the chain of causation. Lord Wright
explained in The Oropesa 196 :
“ultroneous, something unwarrantable, a new cause which disturbs the sequence of
events, some thing which can be described as either unreasonable or extraneous or
extrinsic.”

Also in the case The Paludina the court was engaged in considering the issue novus
actus interveniens. The Paludina was also liable for the damaged propeller of the
Singelton Abbeys. First, The Paludina caused a collision with the Singleton Abbey in
Valletta harbour. The damage of the mentioned propeller arose from a collision
between the Singleton Abbey and a third ship when the Singelton Abbey was
manoeuvring to escape from the place of collision. Lord Sumner assessed the case by
the following consideration:
“The Singleton Abbey herself is the cause of the damage she has suffered, not merely if
her captain’s action brought it about negligently. She will be the cause of that damage if
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82

her captain, freely and as the direct consequence of his own decision, brought it about it
all.” 197

He also took the case The City of Lincoln into account:
“In that case the captain…steered his own course, as every navigator must, but he
steered it wrong because his means of observation, the log, etc. had been carried away in
the collision. The hand of the original wrongdoer was still heavy on his ship and his own
navigation was not the sole human agency determining her fortunes.” As a result The
Plaudina was held at fault and the Appeal of the Singleton Abbey failed, because “the
damage was due to her own action in the working of her engines, coupled with the action
of it on the part of the Sara( the third ship).”

6.4 The Traffic Regulation
From the facts above we could see that infringement of the Collision Regulations
forms a base for almost all collision claims. Because of the lack in knowledge on
how the good seamanship had evolved, most lawyers rarely take it into consideration.
The standard of good seamanship is rarely being put as a statute, it is very difficult
for a court to see and render judgment based on how the conduct of the navigator
should have been, except than referring to the COLREGS. By having traffic
regulation which specifically regulate the conduct of good seamanship while
navigating in certain area, then the court of that jurisdiction could bring about a fair
trial to which the consideration of why the collision occur and analyze the case from
the view of good seamanship while looking into the COLREGS.

With this taken into consideration, the claim could be adjudicated fairly to bring
about fair apportionment of liability to each party affected by the collision. The
guidance or standard to Good seamanship is illustrated in a proposed Traffic
regulation for Malacca Strait which would indicate the control and measures, to
ensure vessel prior of entering the Strait and while navigating in route to take
adequate seamanship measures for the safety of navigation with reference to
pollution and marine casualty control 198 .
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Annex 1.
Proposed Draft of Maritime Traffic Regulation in Malacca Strait
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PART I
PURPOSE, SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS
Purpose and scope
Rule 1
The purpose of these Regulations, which shall apply to all ships navigating in the
Malacca Strait, is to regulate the maritime traffic scheme in order to ensure the safety
of navigation, life and property and to protect the environment in the region.

Definitions
Rule 2
For the purposes of these Regulations:
(a) "Administration" means Marine Department Malaysia
(b) "The Strait" mean the area within the boundaries of the Malacca Strait
(c) "Vessel" means any vehicle able to navigate at sea except craft under oars;
(d) "Vessel in transit" means a vessel, the passage of which shall be innocent,
continuous, expeditious and without delay. The passage through the Strait and other
waterways shall be planned so as not to stop at any port, berth or any other place, and
a notification to that effect shall have been made by the master of the vessel to the
Malacca Strait Vessel Traffic Control scheme authorities before entering into the
Straits;
(e) "A vessel interrupting its transit passage" means a vessel the master or commander
of which has notified during passage that the vessel has given up its transit passage;
(f) "Vessel whose transit passage has been interrupted" means a vessel, which, due to
maritime accidents such as collision and grounding, or for other reasons, is subject to
investigations, legal proceedings and inquiries carried out by the administration or
legal authorities;
(g) Nuclear-powered vessels or vessels carrying nuclear, noxious and dangerous
goods and wastes mean:
1. Any nuclear-powered vessel or any vessel carrying nuclear, noxious and dangerous
goods, except for military vessels;
2. Vessels carrying cargo classified by the International Maritime Organization as
dangerous, (including petroleum and its derivatives) and vessels constructed or used

ii

for the carriage of substances qualified in the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973 as modified by the Protocol of 1978
(MARPOL 73/78) and its annexes as pollutants and such vessels which have not
effected the necessary operations to eradicate the dangers of such cargo;
3. Vessels carrying nuclear, dangerous and noxious wastes as defined in international
conventions and domestic legislation;

(h) "Deep-draught vessel" means a vessel with a maximum draught of 10 metres or
more;
(i) "Large vessel" means a vessel 150 metres or more in length;
(j) "Total towing length" means the distance between the fore of the towing vessel and
the aft of towed vessel or the distance between the aft of the pushing vessel and
the fore of the vessel being pushed when sailing at full speed ahead.
(k) "Northern entrance to the Malacca Strait" means the line joining
(l) "Southern entrance to the Malacca Strait" means the line joining
(m) "Daytime" means the period between sunrise and sunset;
(n) "Nighttime" means the period between sunset and sunrise.

PART II
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Boundaries
Rule 3
The boundaries of the traffic separation scheme which shall apply in the Straits and
other waterways are delimited:
In the north, at approximate coordinates of: Lat 0050 00’ N, Long 0990 30’ E
In the south, at approximate coordinates of: Lat 0010 10’ N Long 1030 28’E

Competence of the Administration
Rule 4
All vessels proceeding in the Malacca Strait shall comply with the navigation rules
laid down or to be laid down by the Administration to ensure the safety of life and
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property, provided such rules do not violate existing regulations, as well as with the
warnings of the Administration.

Technical Specification of Vessels which transit through the Straits and the Notice
to be given by these Vessels
Rule 5
A. All vessels that shall pass through the Malacca Strait shall be seaworthy in
accordance with international rules and the legislation of the State whose flag they fly.
B. Before giving the Sailing Plan II referred to in Rule 8, masters of the vessels,
except those of military vessels, shall establish the technical conformity of their vessel
with the following conditions and make an entry to this effect in the log book.
(a) Main and auxiliary machinery units shall be operational as usual and be ready to
manoeuvre at any time;
(b) Emergency generators shall be readily operational at all times;
(c) Main and auxiliary steering gear, gyro-compass and radar shall be operational as
usual;
(d) Navigation bridge R.P.M, steering-wheel and pitch indicators shall be operational
and illuminated;
(e) Navigation lights and vessel's whistle shall be operational and the equipment of
the navigation bridge shall be complete;
(f) All communication systems, particularly those between the navigating bridge and
fore, aft, steering wheel and engine control room, and all alarm systems shall be
operational;
(g) VHF radio-telephone equipment shall be fully operational;
(h) Projector and at least a pair of binoculars shall be kept ready for use day and night
in the navigation bridge;
(i) Windlass and its running riggings shall be ready for use and both anchors will be
prepared for lowering with crew standing by;
(j) There shall be an emergency fire wire at the fore and aft of vessels carrying
dangerous cargo. A towing hawser and hauling lines shall be available at the fore and
aft of vessels other than those carrying dangerous cargo;
(k) A vessel shall not be with trim by the stern so as to affect the ability to manoeuvre
and steer, and no vessel shall enter into the Straits with trim by the head;
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(l) As far as possible vessels shall be trimmed so that the propeller will be totally
below water level and in cases of necessity the blade of the propeller which shall be
above water level shall not exceed 5 per cent of the propeller's diameter;
(m) The vessel will be trimmed and loaded such that the fore of the vessel and the sea
beyond shall be easily visible from the navigation bridge;
(n) Each vessel shall have these Regulations and an up-to-date version of the nautical
charts of the Malacca Strait;
(o) All crew employed on vessels shall be in accordance with the International
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers
(STCW-78). Masters of the vessels which are not in conformity with the abovementioned conditions shall notify the Vessel Traffic Control Scheme Centre. The
Administration shall take such measures prescribed in Rule 10 for
vessels which do not report in conformity with the conditions above.

Sailing Plan I
Rule 6
Masters, owners or agents of the vessels carrying dangerous cargo OR vessels which
are 500 gross tons and more, 24 hours before entering the entrance of the Malacca
Strait, shall give Sailing Plan I (SPI) as determined by the Administration.
Sailing Plan I, to be given to the Vessel Traffic Control Centre, shall contain the
following information:
- Name of the vessel;
- Flag of the vessel;
- Call sign;
- Tonnage;
- Port of departure;
- Port of arrival;
- Cargo;
- Whether a pilot is requested;
- Deficiencies of the vessel which affect navigation adversely;
- Other information;
Vessels carrying dangerous cargo
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Sailing Plan II
Rule 7
Masters who have given Sailing Plan I and established that their vessel is in
conformity with the conditions prescribed in Rule 6, shall give Sailing Plan II two
hours before arriving at the entrance to the Strait, or at a distance of 20 NM from the
entrance to the Strait, whichever comes first.
Sailing Plan II, which shall be given by VHF to the Traffic Control Centre, should
contain the following information:
- Name of the vessel;
- Flag of the vessel;
- Call sign;
- Position of the vessel;
- Estimated arrival time to the entrance of the Strait;
- Whether a pilot is requested;
- Inabilities of the vessel affecting sailing adversely;
- Other information.

After giving Sailing Plan II vessels shall navigate taking into account feedback
information given by the Traffic Control Centre. The information regarding the traffic
in the Straits as well as the fact that Sailing Plan II has been given should be recorded
in the logbook.

Position report
Rule 8
Vessels no longer than 20 metres, when they are at a distance of 5 NM to the entrance
of the Straits, shall give, by VHF, to the Traffic Control Centre situated on the
approaching side, the position report as determined by the Administration and
containing the necessary information for the identification of the vessel. Other vessels
transiting through the strait should report to the appropriate traffic control stations
(VTIS) during the passage in the strait.
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Notice to be given by a vessel which loses its technical ability before entering the
Straits
Rule 9
Vessels which for whatever reason lose their technical sufficiency or whose
navigation equipment becomes in operational before entering the Straits shall provide
the pertinent information by means of telex, telephone, fax or VHF. The relevant port
authority will indicate, through the Traffic Control Centre, the place where the vessel
should wait while repairs are carried out. If the breakdown of navigation equipment
continues after repairs and survey, the passage of the vessel through the Straits shall
be affected in a way determined by the Administration considering the safety of
navigation.

The Traffic Control Centre and traffic control stations
Rule 10
For the execution and control of the traffic separation scheme and for the operation of
the reporting system,
The Administration has set up a Traffic Control Centre and traffic control stations
(VTIS). The relevant position of the stations and its reporting position is being
indicate din the Sailing direction NP 70and the Chart of Malacca strait (BA 3502)

Pilotage sign
Rule 11
Vessels passing through the Malacca Strait and the other waterways with a pilot shall
hoist an (H) pennant during daytime.

Conditions of anchorage for vessels in transit
Rule 12
Vessels transiting through the Strait can stop for 48 hours to obtain necessary
provisions in the locations specified by the Traffic control centre. In such cases they
shall get permission from the Port Authority and will stay under the surveillance of
the concerned authorities without taking free pratique.
During this stay the following activities are allowed:
- If there is a breakdown in the vessel: to bring experts, mechanics and workers to the
vessel in order to inspect and to repair the breakdown;
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- Visits by the vessel's Agent;
- Disembarking of the master or a crew member to purchase necessary supplies for the
vessel;
- To disembark any ill crew;
- To employ new crew to replace any hospitalized crew.
Vessels in transit which shall stay more than 48 hours in port should anchor at the
anchorage indicated, and take free pratique. Vessels interrupting a transit by
anchoring shall be subject to all controls and procedures rendered necessary by reason
of security, customs and other legislation.

PART III
TRANSIT THROUGH THE STRAIT
Procedures for passage
Rule 13
Masters will ensure that no unauthorized personnel shall enter the navigating bridge,
chart room and wings while navigating in the Strait, and that nothing will hinder the
ability of the crew to command the vessel and to keep watch around the vessel.
Authorized personnel will remain on duty by the main engine whether or not the
controls of the engines are in the main engine room. While navigating in the Straits
steering will be controlled manually; automatic pilot systems will not be used.
The emergency steering gear will also be kept ready for immediate use with personnel
on duty to use it.

Steady steering light
Rule 14
Vessels, the distance between whose bridge and fore is 150 metres or more, and
vessels, whose bridge is very close to the fore of the vessel, at nighttime shall carry at
the fore of the vessel a blue or green steady steering light visible only from the bridge.
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Speed
Rule 15
The normal speed in the Straits is 10 nm/hr relative to land. This speed may be
exceeded if steering way cannot be reached, by informing the traffic control stations
and taking care to avoid collisions and creating waves harmful to the environment.

Overtaking
Rule 16
Vessels navigating in the Straits shall not overtake vessels proceeding before them
except due to necessity.
(a) Vessels passing through the Strait shall maintain a distance of at least 8 cable
between each other.
(b) If for any reason a vessel is going to reduce speed while navigating in the Straits,
she shall first inform the vessels proceeding behind it.
(c) A vessel navigating under its own power at low speed will stay to the most
starboard side of its own traffic separation lane and will permit faster vessels to
overtake it.
(d) When a vessel needs to overtake another in front of it, it shall first obtain a traffic
report from the traffic control station, and if the situation is clear, shall inform the
vessel to be overtaken. The overtaking shall if possible take place without speed
alterations.
(e) Overtaking will not take place near the One Fathom Bank, Entrance to Port Klang,
Entrance to Port Dickson, Entrance to Port of Malacca

Accidents and breakdowns while under way
Rule 17
Vessels whose transit passage through the Strait has been interrupted due to accidents,
breakdowns or compulsory anchoring shall immediately inform the traffic control
station and request recommendations and instructions. After measures are taken by
the relevant Port Authority in regard to the safety of the vessel and the area, the vessel
shall take a pilot and carry out the action required for the completion of the passage.
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Vessel not under command
Rule 18
The passage through the Straits of a "vessel not under command" or "a vessel
restricted in its ability to manoeuvre", as defined in COLREG 72, depends on the
special permission of the Administration. If a vessel becomes "not under command"
in the course of passage, the master of the vessel shall immediately inform the Traffic
Control Station and follow the instructions given.

Towing operations
Rule 19
A vessel or any other object may only pass through the Straits when being towed by a
suitable tugboat of sufficient power. A vessel may not pass in the tow of another
vessel.
(a) The length of the tow will be appropriately shortened before entering the Straits.
(b) The Administration may take the necessary measures to ensure that vessels and
their tow, which together exceed 150 metres, keep their course.
(c) On vessels or objects being towed, extra hailing lines of sufficient strength and the
necessary crew will be kept on board to immediately replace the towing hawser
should it break.
(d) If possible the propeller and steering gear of a vessel being towed will be kept in
operation.

Vessels leaving a port in the Straits
Rule 20
Before getting under way from ports, piers or anchorage positions in the Straits,
vessels will inform the traffic control stations and receive any necessary information
concerning the traffic flow. Such vessels will wait for clear traffic before entering the
traffic flow in the Straits.

Leaving the traffic separation scheme
Rule 21
Vessels which have to leave the traffic separation scheme to berth, moor to a buoy,
drop anchor, turn back or due to breakdowns and other exceptional circumstances
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shall inform the traffic control station and any other vessels which may be in the
vicinity.

Halting traffic due to compulsory circumstances
Rule 22
Maritime traffic in the Straits may be temporarily diverted by the Administration due
to construction work including underwater work, drilling, fire extinguishing, scientific
and sports activities, salvage and rescue operations, prevention and eradication of
maritime pollution, pursuing criminals, accidents and similar cases. The diversion and
opening of traffic will be announced by the relevant port authority and traffic control
stations to vessels and persons involved. After the reopening of the Straits to traffic
following a temporary diversion, the traffic control stations will announce to the
vessels in transit or entering the strait.

Obligation to navigate within the lanes
Rule 23
Vessels must proceed within the designated traffic lanes. Vessels which cross the
lanes may be fined according to Merchant Shipping Order 1984, as well as be brought
to the attention of the International Maritime Organization and the flag State.

Deep-draught vessels
Rule 24
Deep-draught vessels navigating in the straits shall exhibit at night three red lights in a
vertical line visible over an arc of the horizon of 360 degrees, and in daytime a
cylinder-shaped sign visible from all directions. Other vessels in the Straits shall not
inhibit the manoeuvres of deep draught vessels and shall provide sufficient space for
navigation. At crossing and turning points in the traffic separation scheme, other
vessels in the Straits, shall keep clear of the course of deep-draught vessels.

Anchorage locations
Rule 25
Anchorage locations for the traffic separation scheme are given below:
(a) Penang North
(b) Lumut Outer Anchorage
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(c) Port Klang Outer Anchorage
(d) Malacca Port Anchorage
(e) Tanjung Pelepas Outer Anchorage
Anchored vessels will ensure that they remain within the limits of the anchorage areas.
It is forbidden to anchor within 2.5 cables from the shore near all these anchorage
locations.

PART IV
COMMON RULES FOR THE STRAIT
Large vessels
Rule 26
The owner or manager of large vessels which plan to pass through the Straits shall
provide information to the Administration on the vessel and its cargo at the planning
stage of the passage. The Administration, taking into consideration the morphological
and physical structure of the Straits, the vessel's dimensions and manoeuvre
capability, the safety of life, property and the environment, and maritime traffic
conditions, shall inform the applicants of the outcome of its review.

Nuclear-powered vessels or vessels carrying nuclear,
dangerous or noxious cargo or waste
Rule 27
To navigate through the Straits and other waterways, nuclear-powered vessels or
vessels carrying nuclear cargo or waste which intend to pass through the Straits and
other waterways must obtain permission, in accordance with relevant regulations from
the Maritime Administration at the planning stage of the passage. Vessels carrying
dangerous or noxious waste must obtain permission from the Ministry for
Environment at the planning stage of the passage. Vessels carrying dangerous cargo
and, nuclear-powered or nuclear cargo carrying vessels as well as vessels
carrying nuclear, dangerous or noxious waste, whose passage requires special
permission, must comply with the pertinent International Maritime Organization
regulations and shall transport their cargo according to these regulations.
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Such vessels will exhibit a (B) pennant in daytime and in nighttime, a red light visible
over an arc of the horizon of 360 degrees.

Vessels which are required to take pilots
Rule 28
Foreign vessels are advised for safety purposes to take a pilot. The Administration
may establish compulsory pilotage requirements in certain areas in the Straits

Berthing or anchoring without notification
Rule 29
Vessels which while navigating in the traffic separation scheme anchor, berth at docks
or quays or moor to buoys without providing notification and receiving permission
shall be removed by pilots and tugboats provided by the relevant port authority. The
expenses for such operations will be paid by the vessel's owner, manager or agent.
Vessels are not to anchor in the traffic separation scheme except for emergency
situations. In case a vessel has to anchor due to an emergency, the traffic control
station will be immediately notified. The Administration will then move the vessel by
using pilots and tugboats to a safer location, to clear the traffic separation scheme.

The expenses for such operations will be paid by the owner, manager or agent of the
vessel.

Ban on environnemental pollution
Rule 30
No refuse, landfill, bilge water, domestic and industrial waste, ecologically harmful or
unsanitary material, oil and other pollutants can be dumped or discharged into the sea
in the Strait .Vessels in the Strait must take every measure not to create air pollution.

Notification requirement and reporting
Rule 31
(a) The masters of vessels in the Strait are required to notify any incidents such as
illness, disease, injury or death to the traffic control stations for conveyance to the
relevant authorities.
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(b) Pilots, traffic control station personnel, masters and public officials who observe
vessels not complying with regulations or navigating improperly will immediately
report the incident to the concerned port authority and will present a written report
within 24 hours. The relevant port authority will take the necessary action at once and
commence the legal procedure concerning the vessel and her master.
(c) Pilots will inform the traffic control station of any maritime accidents which occur
on the vessels they are piloting as well as of any situations detrimental to maritime
safety which they may notice en route, and will submit a written report to the relevant
port authority.

Visibility
Rule 32
Information on reduced visibility will be provided by the Administration to vessels
and others concerned.
(a) Whenever visibility is 2 NM or less in any part of the Strait, vessels passing
through the Strait will keep their radar turned on constantly to provide radar readings.
On vessels with two radars, one of them will be assigned to the pilot's usage.
(b) When visibility is 1.5 NM or less in any part of the Strait, vessels whose radar
does not provide a complete display ability shall not enter the Strait.
(c) When visibility in the Strait is 1 NM or less, vessels carrying hazardous cargo and
large vessels shall not enter into the Straits.
(d) When visibility in any part of the Straits is 0.5 NM, maritime traffic shall be open
in the appropriate direction and closed in the opposite. In such situations only vessels
less than 100 metres in length and which do not carry hazardous cargo can navigate in
the direction open to traffic.

PART V
VIOLATIONS
Violations and regulations
Rule 33
Unless a more severe penalty is prescribed by relevant Malaysian legislation, the
Penal Code of Merchant Shipping Order (Collision Regulation 1984) will be applied
to masters and sailors found to be in violation of these regulations.
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Annex 2.
1) Genimar and Larry L

Genimar

Normal Traffic Flow

Larry L

Pearl Creek and its tow

Figure 4: Collision between Genimar and Larry L

2) Joaquin Ponte Maya and Martin Fierro
At about 1910 hrs, when the vessels were 1400 metres apart, the order hard to
starboard was given by those on board Joaquin Ponte Maya
At about the same time, those onboard Martin Fierro first saw her green light in
addition to her red. At about 1912 hrs , when the vessels were about 700 metres apart,
those onboard Martin Fierro, having lost sight of the red light of Joaquin Ponte Naya
and being able only to see her green light, gave the order hard to port and sounded
two short blasts. At 1913hrs, when the vessels were 400 to 500 metres apart, those on
board Martin Fierro, having seen the red light of Joaquin Ponte Naya open again and
the green light shut in, gave the order hard to starboard and sounded a signal of one
short blast. At 1914 hrs, when the vessel were about 200 to 300 metres apart, those
onboard Martin Fierro gave orders wheel amidships and full astern. A collision
occurred near mid-channel at 1915hrs,when Joaquin Ponte Naya’s speed through the
water was 6 knots whilst that of Martin Fierro was 8 to 9 knots.The stem and port
bow of Martin Fierro struck the port side of Jaoquin Ponte Naya at an angle of 35
degrees leading aft.
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Hydrodynamic Interaction: When a ship is proceeding at sea, the pressure in the water
is increased near the bow, reduced over the midships and increased again at the stern.
The pressure interact with one another in such
a way
Martin
Fierro that lateral forces either push or
pull the ship off its course 1 .Merchant Notice 930 of the United Kingdom on
Figure 5: Collision Illustration of both the vessel (Joaquin Ponte Maya and Martin Fierro) 2

2

(1974) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 203. quoted in Chap. 4 p. 35
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